




**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Arms Control



19980113 205

[DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 5]

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-92-024

CONTENTS

14 August 1992

CHINA

Commentary on U.S.-Russian Partnership [Ying Qian; Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION 29 Jun]	1
Daily on Strategic Missile Troop Modernization [XINHUA 23 Jul]	2

EAST ASIA

JAPAN

Bush Announcement on Plutonium, Uranium Welcomed [KYODO 14 Jul]	3
---	---

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

ISRAEL

Stance on Chemical Nonproliferation Treaty Outlined [HA'ARETZ 16 Jul]	4
---	---

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

GENERAL

CIS Summit Discusses Collective Security, Strategic Forces	5
Leaders Hold Press Conference [Moscow Radio 6 Jul]	5
Shaposhnikov on Main Command, Strategic Forces [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 9 Jul]	6
Further on Shaposhnikov Remarks [ITAR-TASS 8 Jul]	6
Discusses Military Coordination [Moscow Radio 8 Jul]	7
Need for Rethinking Doctrine, Strategy Seen [D. Proektor; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 21 Jul] ...	8

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Deputy Minister Praises Framework Agreement With U.S. [ITAR-TASS 2 Jul]	9
Constitutional Democrats Criticize Framework Agreement [INTERFAX 2 Jul]	10
Spokesman Voices 'Concern' at U.S. Senators [IZVESTIYA 9 Jul]	10
Revised Concept of U.S. Nuclear Parity Viewed [S. Blagovolin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Jul]	10
Outlook for U.S. Senate Ratification of START Treaty [IZVESTIYA 30 Jul]	12

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Russia Said Unready for ABM Cooperation With United States [A. Radionov; ROSSIYA 13-19 May]	12
U.S.-Russian Talks on Global Defense Proposal	14
Outlook for Talks [INTERFAX 11 Jul]	14
Talks Begin [ITAR-TASS 13 Jul]	15
Text of Joint Statement [ITAR-TASS 15 Jul]	15
Newspaper Sums Up Provisions [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Jul]	15
'Diplomat' Comments [INTERFAX 15 Jul]	16
Deputy Foreign Minister Comments [ITAR-TASS 17 Jul]	16
Japan Said to Link Kurils, GPALS Role [V. Bantin; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 24 Jul]	17

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Ukrainian Official Cited on Republic's Military Power [Moscow International 2 Jul]	17
Pact on Conventional Force Ceilings Viewed [S. Tosunyan; IZVESTIYA 7 Jul]	17

Russian Parliament Ratifies CFE Treaty, Implementation Accord	18
Supreme Soviet Resolution [INTERFAX 8 Jul]	18
Deputy Defense Minister Reports [V. Mironov; Russian TV 8 Jul]	18
Outlines Reductions [V. Mironov; INTERFAX 8 Jul]	18
Foreign Ministry Official Comments [G. Berdennikov; Moscow Radio 8 Jul]	19
Yeltsin, Walesa Discuss Troop Withdrawal [ITAR-TASS 9 Jul]	20
Latvian Chairman Demands Russian Troop Withdrawal [A. Gorbunovs; Riga Radio 10 Jul]	20
Estonia's Ruutel Demands Russian Troop Withdrawal	21
To CSCE: Threat to North Europe Security [BALTFAX 10 Jul]	21
Meets With Yeltsin, Kozyrev [BALTFAX 10 Jul]	21
Lithuania Seeks Russian Troop Pullout at CSCE Summit	21
CSCE Declaration Urges Pullout [Vilnius Radio 10 Jul]	21
Commentary on Final Document [Vilnius International 10 Jul]	21
Landsbergis Holds Press Conference [BALTFAX 13 Jul]	22
Yeltsin Cited on 'Necessity' of Withdrawal [Vilnius Radio 13 Jul]	22
Landsbergis on Relations With Russia [V. Landsbergis; Vilnius Radio 16 Jul]	22
CSCE Leaders Sign Conventional Forces Accord [ITAR-TASS 10 Jul]	23
Army Spokesman on CSCE Confidence-Building Measures [Col B. (?Tretyakov); Moscow International 11 Jul]	23
Russian Naval Forces in Baltics Being Withdrawn [POSTFACTUM 18 Jul]	23
Russian Parliament Report on CFE Impact on Forces [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 29 Jul]	23

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Russian Spokesman Lauds U.S. Tactical Arms Withdrawal [ITAR-TASS 7 Jul]	26
U.S. Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons Welcomed [M. Aleksandrov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Jul]	26

NUCLEAR TESTING

Bush Rejection of Nuclear Test Proposal Noted	26
Letter by Administration Official Cited [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 16 Jul]	26
U.S. 'Failed' To Meet Challenge [V. Kozyakov; Moscow International 17 Jul]	27

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Russia Assumes USSR Treaty Obligations on CBW	27
Supreme Soviet Resolution [ITAR-TASS 8 Jul]	27
Funds Allocated for Elimination [INTERFAX 8 Jul]	27
Practical, Political Problems in CW Elimination	28
Committee Chairman Views Cost [A. Kuntsevich; INTERFAX 8 Jul]	28
Major Views CW Convention Implementation [M. Zheglov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 Jul]	28
Dangerous Situation at Kaliningrad CW Dump [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 16 Jul]	29

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Russian Military Officials, Ukraine's Bizhan Cited [INTERFAX 6 Jul]	30
Ukrainian Official on 'Administrative Control' of Missiles [I. Bizhan; ITAR-TASS 6 Jul]	30
Ukrainian President on Nuclear Arms Elimination	31
To Liquidate Weapons 'With Pleasure' [AFP 7 Jul]	31
On-Site Weapons Destruction Urged [IZVESTIYA 9 Jul]	31
Byelorussian Defense Minister on Arms Withdrawal Schedule	31
Command of Strategic Forces Viewed [INTERFAX 7 Jul]	31
Caution on Non-Nuclear Status Advised [POSTFACTUM 8 Jul]	32
'Determined To Become Nuclear-Free' [ITAR-TASS 14 Jul]	32
No 'Hurry' To Withdraw Nuclear Arms [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Jul]	32
Kazakh Aides Reassure U.S. on Nuclear Arms Control, Elimination [ITAR-TASS 16 Jul]	32
CIS, Ukrainian Officials on Nuclear Arms [Ye. Shaposhnikov, I. Bizhan; INTERFAX 17 Jul]	33

WEST EUROPE

FRANCE

Reasons for Rejecting American GPALS Project [P. Boniface; LIBERATION 29 Jun]	35
Defense Minister Views Military Capability [P. Joxe; Paris Radio 15 Jul]	35

GERMANY

Kohl on CFE Implementation, Personnel Ceiling Pacts [Berlin ADN 10 Jul]	37
Defense Minister Announces Conventional Arms Cuts [DPA 10 Jul]	38

UNITED KINGDOM

Defense Study Suggests New Roles for Armed Forces [PRESS ASSOCIATION 7 Jul]	38
---	----

Commentary on U.S.-Russian Partnership

HK1307052592 Hong Kong LIAOWANG
OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese
No 26, 29 Jun 92 pp 25-26

["International Commentary" by Ying Qian (2019 6197), Huang Yong (7806 3144): "Yeltsin's Visit to U.S. and U.S.-Russian Partnership"]

[Text] From 16 to 18 June, Russian President Yeltsin visited the United States, held a U.S.-Russian summit with President Bush, the second time this year, and signed a series of bilateral agreements and declarations embracing the further reduction of strategic weapons, and concretely demonstrated the content and characteristics of the U.S.-Russian partnership.

In early February, after meeting at Camp David, Bush and Yeltsin published a joint declaration, saying that the United States and Russia no longer "look on each other as potential opponents" but as "partners with the same values." Less than six months later, they met again because of the political needs in their own countries, as well as intentionally promoting this "partnership." As far as Bush is concerned, the breakthrough obtained at the meeting on the question of the strategic weapons reduction is undoubtedly conducive to his reelection. As for Yeltsin, the major objective of his trip was to seek more aid and investment from the United States so as to resolve the immediate problems at home. Therefore, the topics at the Washington summit this time were the reduction of strategic weapons and the U.S. offer of aid to Russia.

In the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the U.S.-Soviet confrontation no longer exists. It seems there is no longer any need for the continued existence of the startling numbers of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and Russia. They have become their heavy burdens. Moreover, the turbulence and the danger that nuclear weapons are getting out of control in where once was the Soviet Union perturbs the United States. Against this background, early this year, the United States and Russia separately proposed further reducing strategic nuclear weapons on the basis of the "Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Weapons," which was signed between the United States and the former Soviet Union and which has not taken effect. While seeking to reduce the scale of nuclear stockpiles, the United States is attempting to gain nuclear superiority, whereas Russia, not content with being the "second-class" military power, still wants to maintain the "nuclear balance." In view of this, their proposals had a great deal of discrepancies. No great breakthrough was made despite the many talks between their foreign ministers in the five months that followed until Bush and Yeltsin made a deal at the Washington summit this time.

According to the new agreement, by 2003 at the latest, the United States and Russia will have reduced the warheads of their respective strategic nuclear weapons from some 10,000 at the present time to 3,500; and

dismantled all land-based multi-warhead intercontinental guided missiles in 11 years. Moreover, each side will have limited the number of the warheads of their sea-based guided missiles to below 1,750. Bush said the fact that the agreement was reached was an "important token of a new relationship" between the United States and Russia. Yeltsin held that the agreement reflects a "fundamental change" in U.S.-Russian political and economic relations. The U.S. media pointed out: The agreement implies that Russia tacitly admits the U.S. superiority with respect to strategic weapons. Because if the agreement is implemented, Russia will completely lose its superiority in land-based multi-warhead guided missiles. In fact, no more than 3,000 strategic weapon warheads will be left over. Therefore, Russia will be no match with the United States with respect to nuclear weapons whether in quality and quantity of nuclear weapons. The rudimentary reason Russia has given up the "balance principle" is that it is currently faced with serious economic difficulties and that it badly needs aid from the United States and other Western countries. That is why it has succumbed to the U.S. pressure by making great concessions on strategic weapons. THE NEW YORK TIMES pointed out: Russia's practice is to "eliminate nuclear warheads in exchange for the dollars." Moreover, the fact that Russia made great concessions from the beginning of the summit to bring about a new agreement on nuclear weapons reduction was meant to enhance the atmosphere of Yeltsin's visit and then to spur the United States to take the soonest-possible action on the question of aid offer. In addition, destruction of nuclear weapons as such will entail a great deal of funds and will not be a light burden to Russia whose economy is already seriously bad.

Yeltsin has indeed obtained some reward from the U.S.-Russian agreement on the further reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. The dozens of agreements signed between the United States and Russia; including those by which the United States will grant Russia most-favored-nation status, U.S. federal organizations will offer insurance for private investments in Russia, relax high-tech trade with Russia, and so forth. They are measures aimed at integrating Russia with the global economy. THE NEW YORK TIMES maintains that although the agreements will not take effect after at least one year, they are "psychological support" for Russia. Bush also indicated to Yeltsin: The "democratic destiny" of Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union is "the most important issue in our current diplomatic policy."

However, that Congress has long delayed passing the aid proposal by the Bush administration has somewhat disappointed Yeltsin. Once the proposal is approved, the Bush administration will be empowered to join other Western industrial countries in offering \$24 billion in financial aid to Russia. If it is not approved, it will affect the U.S. aid plan as well as those of all other Western countries. Since the U.S. economic recovery is slow in coming, inflation remains at a high level, government's

financial deficit is viciously inflating, and the Los Angeles incident has exposed the social problems generally existing in the United States, there is a very high call against offering foreign aid and for resolving the U.S. own problems first. Out of political needs in the election year, some U.S. congressmen are creating difficulties to the passing of Russia's aid proposal in Congress. During Yeltsin's visit to the United States, Bush repeatedly urged Congress to pass the aid proposal as soon as possible, taking into consideration the relations between Russia's reform and the U.S. strategic interest. In addressing the U.S. Congress, Yeltsin guaranteed with a solemn pledge to "transform" Russia into a country with Western "democracy and freedom," practicing the market economic system. The address impressed U.S. congressmen and won their applause 21 times. Some congressmen estimate that Yeltsin has already obtained enough votes for the aid proposal to be passed. However, U.S. Government officials told Russia privately that it still needs to wait patiently as the high tide of the U.S. general election is coming soon and as party struggles will be getting more acute, and that this will definitely have an influence on the passing of the aid proposal.

During Yeltsin's visit, the U.S. side held two special meetings of entrepreneurs to enlarge contacts between U.S. and Russian entrepreneurs and encourage U.S. entrepreneurs to invest in and set up factories in Russia. Yeltsin and Bush attended in person the opening ceremony for the meetings of entrepreneurs. Yeltsin urged U.S. businessmen not to miss the good opportunity and "be early rather than late." His speech, indeed, touched participants at the meetings. But THE WASHINGTON POST maintains that the general view of U.S. investors is "what matters is not fine-sounding words but the investment environment."

Of the many documents signed at the end of the meeting of the U.S. and Russian presidents, one is called the "Charter on U.S.-Russian Partnership and Friendly

Relations," or "Washington Charter." The Charter states that the two sides will "cooperate" in political, diplomatic, military, and other areas, and that there is the potential for the establishment of "strategic relations" as well. President Bush said that the results of the summit show that the United States and Russia "have formed a new...partnership." The U.S. media maintain that following the resolution of the question of strategic weapons, the possibility for U.S.-Russian cooperation in other areas will be greater and greater in the future. However, the prospects for the development of the U.S.-Russian "partnership" depends on the progress of Russia's reform and on the scale of aid offered for the reform by the United States and other Western countries.

Daily on Strategic Missile Troop Modernization

OW2307080492 Beijing XINHUA in English
0619 GMT 23 Jul 92

[Text] Beijing, July 23 (XINHUA)—China's strategic missile troops have accomplished over 1,000 research projects in recent years, which have greatly promoted modernization of the military force, the PEOPLE'S DAILY [RENMIN RIBAO] reported today.

The paper said that the troops' preparation time has been cut and the fast reaction capacity has increased drastically.

Among the outstanding research achievements, the paper noted, the second artillery corps engineering institute has mobilized 200 professors and experts to develop a big simulated operational system of strategic missiles in three years.

Scientists and engineers of the troops have also developed a facsimile system, color graphic Chinese processing system, missile control and monitoring system, ballistic remote-sensing system and a visible light surveying system.

JAPAN

Bush Announcement on Plutonium, Uranium Welcomed

OW1407031492 Tokyo KYODO in English 0303 GMT 14 Jul 92

[Text] Tokyo, July 14 KYODO—Japan on Tuesday welcomed U.S. President George Bush's announcement Monday that the United States would no longer produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium in an effort to discourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that the move has great significance for the nuclear disarmament process. The ministry called on other nations to follow suit in stopping production of bomb-grade materials.

The statement said Japan also welcomed the overall set of principles set forth by Bush to guide America's non-proliferation policy in the years ahead.

Bush's initiative also included a number of proposals to strengthen the international community's ability to discourage, or take actions against, individuals or entities contributing to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the technology and missiles that deliver them.

It said actions could include U.N. Security Council embargoes or inspections, extradition agreements, or immigration restrictions.

The Japanese statement said Japan stands ready to cooperate with the U.S. and other countries in strengthening the nonproliferation regime for weapons of mass destruction.

ISRAEL

Stance on Chemical Nonproliferation Treaty Outlined

TA1607121192 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
16 Jul 92 pp A1, A8

[Report by Aluf Ben]

[Excerpt] In one of its coming meetings, the cabinet will discuss the Israeli position on the international treaty for chemical nonproliferation, in anticipation of the treaty's expected endorsement at the Geneva Disarmament Committee in August. Professional teams at the Defense and Foreign Ministries are currently formulating the position, which will be brought up for the political echelons' approval in due time.

The chemical nonproliferation treaty was prepared by the international 40-member Disarmament Committee. Germany represents the committee in talks with various governments joining the treaty, and on 14 July, the German deputy foreign minister, Dr. Josef Holick [name and title as published], visited Israel for talks with relevant Israeli elements.

Holick met with Foreign Ministry Director General Yosef Hadas, Disarmament Affairs Division Director Yehi'el Yativ, and Yequiti'el Mor, the foreign affairs director at the Defense Ministry. The officials acquainted the visitor with Israel's terms for joining the treaty and were briefed on his visits to Pakistan and Iran. Yesterday the German official left for Egypt, where he will present the Israeli positions.

Last year, the government decided that Israel was ready in principle to join the chemical nonproliferation treaty, but because of the state of war in the Middle East and the

tangible danger of chemical weapons, which were employed in the Iran-Iraq war, the government presented conditions.

In his speech at the UN General Assembly in October 1991, former Foreign Minister David Levi said that Israel is in favor of the treaty, but to ensure its efficacy, Israel demands that all the countries in the region join the treaty.

This stand is countered by the demands of several Arab countries, which render their joining the chemical nonproliferation treaty contingent on Israel's signing the treaty for nuclear nonproliferation.

In talks with the German representative, the Israelis presented additional demands:

- A regional inspection forum for chemical weapons, which will take the region's special problems into account, is to be established in the Middle East. A similar forum exists between warring India and Pakistan, which have already agreed to join the chemical nonproliferation treaty.
- The clause allowing every country to revoke its participation in the treaty upon a three-month notice will be amended. Israel argues that this period is too short, as it will allow seceding countries to rearm rapidly.
- Israel objects to surprise visits by international inspectors searching for chemical weapons.
- Israel is to be guaranteed a representation on the executive committee of the body that will implement the treaty. Under the emerging agreement, some 40 countries will be represented in the executive committee on a regional-geographic basis. Israel wants to be classified with the Asian group, where Arab countries have a majority. This problem has come up in numerous international forums, including even sports. [passage omitted]

GENERAL

CIS Summit Discusses Collective Security, Strategic Forces

Leaders Hold Press Conference

LD0707130692 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 2330 GMT 6 Jul 92

[News conference following meeting of CIS leaders in Moscow, with introductory statement by Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev and including statement by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, followed by question and answer session between CIS leaders and assembled correspondents; moderated by unidentified official—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Akayev] Esteemed journalists, 15 issues were included on the agenda of the sitting of the Council of Heads of States today. All these issues were examined and the issues can be divided into three groups. The first group was issues of economic cooperation; the second group of issues concerned the mechanism for implementing collective security; and the third, very important group, was a group of issues pertaining to humanitarian cooperation. And so, it would not, perhaps, be wrong for me to say that there was a qualitative turning point today in the work of the Council of Heads of States and, in the activity of the CIS in general. [passage omitted]

The next group of issues concerned collective security. These included facilities for missile attack early warning systems and space control, an air defense system, the approval of the provision on the Collective Security Council, the verification of the composition of the strategic forces, the organization of the activities of the the high command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, the appointment of the deputy commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, and approval of the provision on the interstate committee for the protection of the state borders. This document was adopted in the form of a protocol since this was not considered to be at a level for discussion by the Council of Heads of States. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified moderator] Thank you. First microphone, please go ahead.

[Terekhov] INTERFAX, Viktor Pavlovich Terekhov. It seems to us that the range of military issues prompted the main arguments. Is this the case or not? In connection with this, esteemed heads of the four states on whose territory nuclear arms are situated, do you hope to resolve this very acute and complex issue concerning the composition of the strategic forces. This constitutes a danger to the world.

[Moderator] To whom are you addressing the question?

[Terekhov] To the four heads of state, Boris Nikolayevich, to the president of Ukraine.

[Moderator] Thank you.

[Byelorussian Supreme Soviet Chairman Shushkevich] We decided today to start without delay talks between these four states. We think that only one of these states, Russia, should be a nuclear state. We have all agreed on this and now a mechanism should be elaborated on how to transfer to this state. The crux of our decision is to start these talks.

[Moderator] Stanislav Stanislavovich has said everything.

[Ukrainian President Kravchuk] I also agree with what has been said. It seems to me that some new approaches have been found today which need to be thoroughly studied, but a general striving and general desire of the four (?involved) states is to find these solutions, to demonstrate good will in this matter, and to take into consideration the interests of our states' national interests and the interests of the world community. I think that this problem will be resolved.

[Yeltsin] A few words. Our foreign ministers of the four states signed the Lisbon protocol and therefore it was easier for us to be base things on the fact that they had already agreed among themselves, and we have only made a decision, a political decision, to immediately begin a negotiating process among the heads of the four states in order to implement the Lisbon protocol. Practically, this is what can be said. [passage omitted]

[Moderator] First microphone.

[INTERFAX Correspondent] This is a question for President Nazarbayev from INTERFAX. I would like to ask this: The CIS Economic Council was your suggestion, Nursultan Abishevich. How do you visualize this, because this is probably the sole—or perhaps the second, apart from the Economic [Ekonomicheskii] Court—means of stabilizing the falling production in the CIS countries.

[Kazakh President Nazarbayev] [passage omitted] In addition, since you asked a question about this, I put forward the suggestion when we were discussing the CIS Joint Armed Forces that a general secretary and an apparatus should be created, similar to what NATO has. This is so that political questions relating to the provision of the CIS troops, to the Joint Armed Forces, political questions relating to mutual relations in defense and finance, research and development, and planning of military weapons would be headed by a civilian, the general secretary, while the commander in chief of the armed forces would be a military man who deals with the training of the military and drawing up the doctrine and strategy of the Joint Armed Forces.

[INTERFAX Correspondent] Did you get backing for this?

[Nazarbayev] I did, a decision was made on both issues. [passage omitted]

Shaposhnikov on Main Command, Strategic Forces*PM0907113092 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Jul 92 p 1*

[Report by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev on 8 July Moscow press conference by Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces: "Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces Will Live On, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov Believes"]

[Text] It is well known that a session of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth was held in Moscow 6 July. Yesterday Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces, held a news conference at 41, Leningrad Prospekt. The meeting of heads of state, he said, was characterized by a constructive and dynamic approach. Six documents were signed on military matters.

Among the most important is the agreement on the component parts of missile early warning systems and space monitoring [kontrol kosmicheskogo prostranstva] systems. It amounts to the following. The facilities comprising these systems are the property of the republics in which they are located, but they fulfill a common goal. There is nothing so terrible about the fact that Moldova did not sign the document, because it has no missile early warning stations on its territory, but there is such a station in Azerbaijan—near Mingechaur. What is to be done about that now? What about the station in Latvia? Marshal Shaposhnikov expressed the view that Russia, as the USSR's successor in the strategic arms sphere, must enter into a talks process with the sovereign republics and resolve the questions that have arisen. An agreement on the air defense system was signed.

The question of strategic arms was resolved with difficulty. Complexities arose because the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has adopted a decision: There should be no foreign troops on the republic's territory. So that means that only Kiev now has the right and opportunity to appoint the relevant commanding officers and draft people into units and formations of the Strategic Forces. And that amounts to administrative control of the troops. Moscow is left with operational control and... the responsibility for nuclear safety. Basically it is proposed that Moscow take responsibility for the actions of Ukrainian specialists, which is not acceptable. Therefore the heads of state issued a protocol memorandum on the need for immediate talks between Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine on the practical implementation of the treaties and agreements that have been concluded relating to the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the former USSR.

An agreement was concluded on the organization of the activity of the Joint Armed Forces Main Command, which will represent the interests of all the republics. The Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces will live on, Ye.

Shaposhnikov noted, since there are now strategic weapons on the territory of four states.

The marshal of aviation outlined the structure of the Commonwealth military system. The Main Command is subordinate to the Council of Heads of State. There will also be a collegial organ—the Council of Defense Ministers. It will hold sessions as necessary, or once every two or three months. A committee for the coordination of nuclear strategy and a secretariat are to be set up under the Council of Defense Ministers. Then there is the Strategic Forces command, to which the nuclear triad is subordinate, and then the directorate responsible for the maintenance of nuclear weapons, and the strategic support organs.

The Main Command incorporates the CIS Joint Armed Forces staff, and attached to it, operating on an ad hoc basis, there will be the committee of chiefs of staff and several other committees, such as the committee on military-technical policy. The deputy chiefs of the Joint Armed Forces staff—one from each Commonwealth state, with his own apparatus—will operate on a permanent basis. A press center is also being set up. The Main Command is raising the question of its own press organ. It is suggested that the journal SOVETSKIY VOIN could fulfill this function.

A decision was adopted on appointing a deputy commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. He is Colonel General Boris Pyankov. He will be concerned with questions of averting conflict situations.

Further on Shaposhnikov Remarks*LD0807132192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1244 GMT 8 Jul 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, July 8 TASS—The basic functions of the main command of the CIS Armed Forces will include single control and centralized management of strategic nuclear arms, coordination of military doctrines and military reforms of CIS countries, settling of armed conflicts both inside the Commonwealth on along its borders. A special structure headed by deputy CIS Commander-in-Chief Boris Pyankov will be in charge of fulfilling the latter task, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the CIS commander-in-chief, said at a press conference on Wednesday [8 July].

Foreign and defence ministers of the Commonwealth will meet in Minsk on July 16 to define the functioning and use of CIS peace-keeping forces, he added.

Heads of state of the Commonwealth ruled that a provision for the main command should be worked out in two months, he stressed, adding 300 military and 100 civilians will be employed there.

The CIS commander-in-chief is subordinated to the Council of Heads of State and runs the Council of

Defence Ministers which will meet once in two-three months, Shaposhnikov said.

The Council of Defence Ministers will have a committee on coordinating nuclear strategy and a secretariat. The strategic forces command will unite strategic missile forces, air and sea-based strategic forces, space defence, the management in charge of nuclear weapons, and strategic intelligence.

Chiefs of staff of CIS Armies will periodically meet at the CIS headquarters, committees on technical policy, logistics support, personnel, and others will be also created. Deputies chief of staff, representing the interests of all CIS members, will permanently work in general headquarters. Commanders of various arms of Russian Armed Forces will become deputies of the CIS commander-in-chief as over 80 per cent of Air Force, Navy and Air-Defence infrastructure belong to Russia, Shaposhnikov said, adding the proposal was approved by heads of state.

The main command will "live long" as strategic nuclear forces are still deployed in four former Soviet Republics, the commander-in-chief said.

Shaposhnikov also added that heads of states agreed to transform the coordinating council of officers' assemblies into a committee on the rights of the military which will be included into the structure of the main command. The committee will be headed by Aleksandr Mochaykin.

The discussion on strategic forces at the latest CIS summit was conducted with due account of Lisbon agreements, which envisage that only Russia remains a nuclear state out of all former Soviet Republics. However, the Ukrainian position on the issue became a stumbling block for the talks. Ukraine ruled that personnel of foreign armies cannot be stationed on its territory. It also took over strategic units and insists on its right for administrative control over strategic forces deployed on its territory.

The issue is to be decided by heads of state of Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus and Kazakhstan. "I believe Ukraine at present is capable, is ready to move in this direction. If there is no movement Ukraine will have to bid farewell to nuclear arms before 1994" as envisaged by Minsk Agreements, Shaposhnikov said.

Discusses Military Coordination

*LD0807152592 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1313 GMT 8 Jul 92*

[Text] General Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Commonwealth Joint Forces, held a news conference today in Moscow on the results of the work of Council of CIS Defense Ministers and the CIS heads of state. Our correspondent Ivan Akkuratov has the details.

[Akkuratov] According to General Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS joint forces, the agreement on BMEW [ballistic missile early warning] systems and

means of space surveillance elicited the most interest. The difficulties with this agreement were that previously this system was built within the framework of one state. Now several countries of the Commonwealth possess some of its components. According to the commander in chief of the CIS joint forces, a decision was found that satisfied all parties.

The agreement on the activity of the High Command of the CIS joint forces was another important point. Now this structure represents the interests of all states, rather than just those of Russia, something that Shaposhnikov had been previously accused of on many occasions. The staff of the High Command will be about 300 people.

An agreement in principle on the coordination of activities to define military doctrines between the Commonwealth countries was also reached. A decision was also made on the council of collective security. After a suggestion by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the post of secretary general of the security council is going to be introduced, similar to that of NATO. His duties will include political consultations and the coordination of positions taken by the CIS countries on military questions.

There were heated debates on the question of deputy commander in chief of the CIS joint forces according to types of armed forces. But having taken into consideration the fact that up to 80 percent of the Air Force, Air Defense Forces, and the Navy are deployed on Russian territory, a decision was made that the commanders of these types of Russian armed forces will concurrently become deputy commanders in chief of the CIS joint forces. Talking about the structure of the High Command of the joint armed forces, General Shaposhnikov described its tasks as follows.

[Begin Shaposhnikov recording] This structure is not made to fit some or other chief or individual, but rather to fit the tasks that will have to be performed by the High Command. First of all, it is reflected in unified control and centralized management of strategic missile forces and in the improvement of the structures and combat readiness in the interests of the Commonwealth as a whole. This is the first very important task.

The second task is connected with the fact that we have begun a military reform in all the Commonwealth states that have formed their own armed forces. Every state of the Commonwealth is beginning to develop its own military doctrine. I think that these concepts—military policy, military doctrine, and military reform—should be coordinated as much as possible.

The third task is that we know we will not be able to avert various conflicts in the future, both within the CIS, and possibly on the border of the CIS. In particular, you know the situation that has arisen on the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. We must, of course, react in some way to these developments.

And the last chief task will consist of achieving maximum coordination of our military policy on a global scale so that we can.... [changes thought] I mean, on the basis of the events and phenomena taking place in the world, we have decided to reach a maximum consensus of our views and to coordinate them as much as possible. [end recording]

[Akkuratov] Another piece of information: It seems the idea of setting up Commonwealth disengagement forces is becoming a reality. Proposals on these peacemaking subunits will be presented at the meeting of the members of the Security Council on 16 July in Tashkent.

Need for Rethinking Doctrine, Strategy Seen

924P0150A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Jul 92 p 4

[Article by Daniil Proektor: "Opinion: What Are the Real Threats We Face? More on Russian Military Doctrine"]

[Text] Now, as the Russian army is being formed, objective assessments of where there is danger and where there is none, where danger could arise and where the notorious "images the enemy" have simply been constructed, are just as crucial as the selection of a seismically inactive site for the construction of a nuclear power plant: Miscalculations are too dangerous.

No, I am by no means proposing that we "totally eliminate" preparations for possible "external" conflicts, which is what General Larionov is accusing me of, apparently, due to a misunderstanding. I only want to focus attention on the fact that in this changed world, the nature of military policy has changed as well, including the direction of the dangers and threats for the new Russia and for the CIS. Once again I will make bold to affirm an idea that has been mentioned before: Despite the large number of dangers and threats, the international situation for Russia on the whole now is more favorable than it has been at any other time in the 20th century. The main threats have shifted to within the CIS. There is no danger, for example, that we are suddenly going to be attacked by American missiles or that the Bundeswehr is going to embark on a military campaign.

This is truly the case, at least for the foreseeable future, although my opponent does not entirely agree with this and is vigilantly warning military theoreticians "not to share the views of Professor Proektor."

That's right. You don't have to "share" them. All you have to do is open up the day's newspapers every morning and turn on the television in the evening. Then you don't need any professors to realize what's going on. Who wants to work "all together" to help us get out of this quagmire, and who is dragging us into one, stirring up the fierce and bloody conflicts and wars along the entire crumbling southern periphery of the CIS, which is already turning into a belt of human destruction covering a vast area from Yugoslavia, Moldova, and the

Dniester region, through the Caucasus to Central Asia. Drawing in neighboring ethnic groups, the flame is already moving toward the center of Russia, toward the capital's television towers, throwing off showers of sparks, which are more and more coming to resemble swastikas. Chauvinism is filling up the vacuum left by the disappearance of internationalism. Hundreds of conflicts are ready to explode under the fire from the mass of "ownerless" weapons. These conflicts are more dangerous than those that led to the first and second world wars because then the armies were kept under control somehow, their arsenals were not plundered by countless military detachments given over to anarchy, and there were no atomic bombs.

With the development of events of this nature at the end of the 20th century, Europe and the world could arrive at an even worse development of events than what happened in the beginning and middle of the century. The Helsinki structure in Europe, which was created with such difficulty, could be destroyed, and a chain reaction of crises could cause a massive regrouping of forces and a new outburst of militarism, fascism, and splintering.

This must be halted at any price. Only we ourselves are capable of doing this. From within. Perhaps through the creation of a confederation along the lines of the EEC. With the support of the entire world community, which is troubled by our excesses, perhaps more than some of us are. We are so accustomed to the old images of the "external enemy," and meanwhile the flame is burning within.

In addition to everything else, shouldn't we realize more profoundly that in the new world, the traditional relationship between peace and war has changed? That wars between developed states are senseless and impossible? That the sphere for the use of force is shrinking, and that in places where before you would have heard arms rumbling right away, politics is doing the talking now?

The dangers for our country are going to depend not only on possible drastic changes in the world situation and the balance of forces, which cannot be foreseen, but much more than before, on ourselves, on our domestic policies. We will make friends for ourselves and live more peacefully if we bring these torturous reforms to a successful conclusion, become a democracy, and join the world community. We will be surrounded by enemies if we break off the reforms and democracy, if we move the internal political axis to the right, if we return to neo-Stalinism and supermilitarization.

Then there will be a second cold war, which we will certainly not be able to survive. The more obstacles that appear on the path of reform and the more hysterical the demonic nationalist mentality becomes, the more quickly others will turn away from us and the more quickly we will move toward another state of international isolation and collapse.

So that is what I mean when I write that "internal threats" are becoming more and more dangerous. But

please do not accuse me of underestimating everything else. The world is seething and churning, upheavals may lie ahead of us that we cannot even imagine now. All of this is so obvious that it is embarrassing to speak about it in a debate that is even the least bit serious. After all, even A. Kuprin's unforgettable semiliterate soldier from *Poyedinok* (The Duel) told the sergeant-major at a "literature lesson" that "there are external enemies and there are internal enemies." Does this need to be proven in a contemporary debate between a general and a professor?

No, I am not saying that the threat from the outside has "disappeared entirely." I am in favor of an updated, modern, mobile army that is worthy of Russia, I am in favor of a common security space for the CIS, of social protection for soldiers and officers. This kind of army would not be necessary if the threat had "disappeared entirely." Could I, having given three decades to military service, really think differently?

But we need to see the new architecture of security in Europe and the world, which may be what lies ahead for us, and we should carry out our military building in accordance with this. Without making any claims whatsoever about the truth, I will take the liberty of laying out in brief my own vision.

Most likely, the key structural elements of this architecture are not going to be wide-reaching wars that end with treaties such as those signed in Vienna or Versailles, but rather pan-European rapprochement and unity within the structures of the CSCE, expanding beyond the borders of Europe and America. Then, there will be a European Union, which will gradually attract and draw in more and more Eastern European countries. And NATO, as a tough, yet flexible, defense and political rod of support. The disarmament process. And most important, the new Russia as a future, and we hope, most important element of European and global stability.

The future security of Europe depends on Russia and on each Russian citizen, no matter what his nationality. This, if you will, is Russia's historic mission, its new global destiny.

It seems to me that Russian military doctrine in the future, about which so much is being said, should proceed from these premises. I am not sure that we are completely clear on this score.

V. Larionov considers military doctrine "the algorithm of military building, in which everything is predetermined by directive.... Strategy contains different alternatives and it is democratic, it allows a competition between opinions and motives, which doctrine does not allow after it has been adopted."

It would have been great if Marshal Zhukov and his generals in that earlier war had followed the prewar doctrine with its mass of archaic principles, if they had not had "their own opinions and motives," that is, if

they had not been creative. It was through their creativity that they contributed to our salvation.

And really, generally speaking, in our very dynamic times can we draw up any long-term doctrine "by directive"? The situation, the technology, change every year, if not every month. For example, in May 1987 we announced with great fanfare, at the highest level, the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member-states. And what is left of it after two or three years? The Warsaw Pact itself is gone!

So, this year we are formulating a new doctrine. Is it really going to "predetermine everything" "by directive" up to the year 2000—which is the approximate deadline that has been announced for the completion of the military reforms? Come on!

That is why in an absolute majority of major states and in NATO they do not talk about doctrines, but about "strategies," "concepts," views, or whatever you like, the point is not the name, but that all of this is constantly being changed and adjusted, as life demands, not as the "algorithms" demand, no matter how scientific they may sound. That's how we should do it, too!

I ask my opponent, whom I have sincerely respected for a long time, to take what has been presented here only as individual ideas, which are certainly not indisputable. Because I always remember the precept of Michel Montaigne: "Stubbornness and excessive ardor in a debate are the clearest signs of stupidity." And I certainly do not want to come across that way.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Deputy Minister Praises Framework Agreement With U.S.

LD0407100292 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1600 GMT 2 Jul 92

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 2 Jul—The Russian-U.S. accords on the further reduction of nuclear weapons which were reached during Boris Yeltsin's official visit to the United States are a well balanced compromise. This is the opinion of Grigoriy Berdennikov, Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs, who held a briefing in Moscow today on that problem. "To spite the conservative-minded opponents of disarmament, I must say that no one made any concessions to anyone. There was compromise on both sides," he said.

Grigoriy Berdennikov took a direct part in drafting the framework agreement signed in Washington. The agreement provides for a three-fold reduction in Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals (overall, from 21,000 to 6-7,000 warheads by the year 2003).

"We are no longer the potential opponents which we previously were with the possession of the most deadly weapons in the world," the Russian diplomat stressed.

Singling out the fundamentally new provisions of the document, Grigoriy Berdennikov noted that for the first time, agreement had been reached on the elimination of the most "destabilizing" weapons—intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. Apart from that, the accords place considerable restrictions on the most powerful component of the U.S. nuclear triad—sea-launched weapons.

As for the joint memorandum on cooperation between Russia and the United States on a global system for protecting the world community, the deputy minister stressed that a broad sphere is being opened up for cooperation in the sphere of early warning, technology, and also on the juridical aspects of this project. He laid particular stress on the fact that the present ABM Treaty is no obstacle to creating such a system and that Russia is in favor of preserving it in its present form.

Replying to questions from journalists, Grigoriy Berdennikov stated that Russia's negative attitude to the U.S. SDI program has not changed. Moreover, Russia continues to adhere to its concept of a nuclear-free world. The United States is not yet ready to take such a step and the Washington accords are a compromise which implements the concept of minimum nuclear deterrence.

Constitutional Democrats Criticize Framework Agreement

*OW0207123392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1036 GMT 2 Jul 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The recent agreements between the Presidents of the U.S. and Russia to reduce strategic offensive arms will "unequivocally result in an imbalance in interests of the powers in U.S. favour and will irreparably damage Russia's defence potential and national interests" - the vice-chairman of the Party of Constitutional Democrats Dmitriy Rogozin has told an IF [INTERFAX] correspondent.

Mr. Rogozin referred to an analysis drawn up by experts on possible effects from the implementation of the accords. The analysis notes that "when Russia reduces SS-18 missiles - the basic component of its strategic nuclear force - to zero by 2003, the U.S. will retain submarines with "Trident-2" missiles on board, capable of delivering strikes on CIS from all strategic directions". Experts regard as a rather complex problem the neutralization and utilization of nuclear warheads and the liquid fuel of missiles, which at a time of economic crisis in Russia will lead to multibillion spendings". With a radical reduction in the strategic offensive weaponry of the two super powers, experts add, their nuclear arsenals

will become comparable with those of France and Britain, "however their missiles are least of all aimed at U.S."

"The understandings in the form they now are unequivocally cannot be ratified by the RF [Russian Federation] Supreme Council"—the experts who prepared the analysis at the request of the Party of Constitutional Democrats conclude.

Spokesman Voices 'Concern' at U.S. Senators

*PM0807142792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Jul 92 Morning Edition p 4*

[Gennadiy Charodeyev report: "Attacks on the START Treaty"]

[Text] A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman has sent IZVESTIYA an official document which expresses Moscow's concern at the attacks in the U.S. Congress on the START Treaty.

It has emerged that our diplomats have received information from Washington that a small group of extreme right-wing U.S. senators have launched a campaign to demand that the administration all but revise some of the key provisions of this treaty and essentially reject it and subsequent accords on the reduction of strategic offensive arms.

In the Russian Foreign Ministry's opinion, such attempts would hardly have been taken seriously but for certain facts. The steps being taken by the extreme right-wingers to wreck the START treaty are simultaneously aimed at eroding the strengthening legal basis of Russian-U.S. partnership, demonstrate a desire to revive the image of Russia as the main enemy of the United States, and give support to the military-industrial complex. It is well known that certain "patriots" in Russia support the same line.

Revised Concept of U.S. Nuclear Parity Viewed

*PM1407092792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Jul 92 p 3*

["Expert's Opinion" article by Sergey Blagovolin, president of the National Security and Strategic Studies Institute: "Parity Yesterday and Today. But What About Tomorrow?"]

[Text] The Washington accords between the presidents of Russia and the United States on a significant reduction of nuclear missile arsenals were ambiguously received in our society. The major doubts and differences of opinion are caused by the following question: Have we lost parity with the United States as a result of these agreements, has strategic equilibrium been disrupted, and—ultimately—has Russia's security been damaged? It is often said in this context that parity was one of our people's greatest gains. Huge sacrifices were

made in order to achieve it, justified by the need to ensure the country's reliable security. What will happen now?

Yes, these questions really require an answer. I will try to provide it on the basis of my own perception of the essence of the matter.

Indeed, no matter what the causes of East-West military confrontation might have been, nuclear missile parity during that period was the most important factor preventing the start of a major war, but let us not forget something else. The essence of this parity boiled down to the fact that both sides retained the potential to cause unacceptable damage to one another in a retaliatory strike.

This task was resolved by them a long time ago, but both sides continued to build up and improve their nuclear forces in the hope of acquiring the potential for a first disabling strike. This, however, was an insoluble problem, at least at the existing level of military technical development [razvitiye]. After all, even in the totally unlikely scenario of all ground-launched missiles being destroyed, submarine-launched missiles would still remain. The latter, even though relatively less accurate, still remained an almost ideal means for a retaliatory strike to be delivered against the most vulnerable targets—cities. But efforts persisted to develop [po sozdaniyu] different combat systems which could be perceived by each side as first-strike means. Thus the parity plank was being constantly raised, threatening to plunge mankind into the abyss of catastrophe.

There is another important consideration, in my view. Different countries at different stages of their history have repeatedly perceived different elements of military might as guarantees of security and have invested vast resources in their development [sozdaniye]. These elements include Britain's navy, France's Maginot Line, etc. For various reasons—economic, political, military technical, etc.—this function of guarantee was sooner or later exhausted. It is perfectly obvious that this fate also lay in store for nuclear missile weapons. It was only a question of when.

How do the Washington agreements appear from this viewpoint? There can be no suggestion at all of any real breach of parity or of any unilateral concessions. First, an approximately equal number of warheads is retained—between 3,000 and 3,500 units each—and this is more than sufficient to cause more than just unacceptable damage. Second, whereas we are giving up the SS-18 missiles, the Americans are giving up their MX missiles which, as we all recall only too well, caused such grave fears among us. Third, not only Russia but the United States as well is converting all remaining ground-launched missiles into single-warhead systems. Fourth, the United States is embarking upon major cutbacks in the most important component of its nuclear missile arsenal—the warheads of submarine-launched missiles. They number 5,760 at present, and this quantity will be

reduced to 1,750, in other words by more than two-thirds. Finally, let us not forget that the United States has agreed to parity at 3,000-3,500 nuclear warheads with Russia, but so far it is still unclear what will happen to strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which represent quite a sizeable quantity. Is this not an important step to meet Russia halfway?

Now to discuss something I perceive as especially substantial. The nature of our relations with the West, and with the United States in particular, is changing. From bringing down the level of military confrontation, we are switching to relations of partnership and later, I hope, to relations of alliance. This is extremely important. I have no doubts that, in the light of perfectly objective circumstances (geopolitical location, level of economic, scientific, and technical development, etc.), Russia is not in a position to ensure its security by itself. The West badly needs the new Russia as an active participant in an overall security system, with its own sufficiently powerful, modern, and effective armed forces, whose size and structure are in line with the new nature of relations between us and the new nature of—alas—the truly numerous threats from a series of other regions.

Without any doubt, the transition to such relations will take time. This cannot be achieved within just a few months. Here we have the inertia of the past, the need to convince yourself that your partners are honoring their commitments, and finally the complexity, size, and cost of the practical measures which will have to accompany this process. In other words, the process of mutual adaptation will take some time, which will produce confidence in the irreversibility of the changes taking place. Perceived as a kind of guarantee from this point of view, it is reasonable to assume that the agreements reached in Washington will not give anyone any tangible advantage.

But the transition to new relations places the very idea of parity on quite a different plane. Let me remind readers that nobody in Japan or West Europe has been or is worried by the lack of parity with the United States. Even though this task is perfectly soluble both economically and technically. The reason behind this lack of worry lies in the very nature of relations between them. I would like to emphasize most strongly that such relations now exist between countries like, for example, the United States and Germany or the United States and Japan, which were fierce opponents in the battlefields of world wars in the relatively recent past. I am perfectly convinced that, if our relations with the West develop as planned, the armed forces of both Russia and our partners, including their nuclear missile component, will be perceived not as a factor of reciprocal threat but as one of the mainstays of an overall security system.

As for the actual concept of parity, it is obviously about to outlive the past meaning of the word. It is about to be replaced by the concept of some kind of "realistic deterrence" based on optimization of defense efforts and

on reappraisal of the scale and nature of threats and the ways to counter them. But this is a different topic.

Thus, I think that there are no grounds for negative assessments of the Washington agreements. Unless, of course, one has in mind certain political objectives unassociated with the country's interests. These agreements mark the beginning of a new and important stage of military activities [voennaya deyatel'nost'] in Russia, timed to coincide with a profound military reform. Of course, the path ahead is far from easy. In order to successfully cross it, it will be necessary to pool the efforts by all who have a vision of Russia as a democratic and strong country whose armed forces are capable of effectively performing the new and complex tasks which we encounter in the world around us.

Outlook for U.S. Senate Ratification of START Treaty

924C2033A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jul 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Aleksandr Shalnev report: "'Russia Day' in Washington"]

[Excerpts] Washington—Tuesday was something akin to "Russia Day" in Washington: A whole series of events connected with us in one way or another occurred on this day. [passage omitted]

Hearings have commenced meanwhile in the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Strategic Arms Reduction [START] Treaty signed by Bush and Gorbachev last summer and on the accord concluded by Bush and Yeltsin this summer on a further winding down of the nuclear arsenals.

But it is clear from what Defense Secretary Richard Cheney had to say that Moscow and Washington will hardly have managed to have coordinated and worded the definitive text of the document based on the Yeltsin-Bush accord by 1 September. "We will work very quickly," the chief of the Pentagon said, "but we cannot predict how long this process will take. We simply hope that we will succeed in getting it done soon."

There is in principle no particular problem here. On the contrary, it would be even better were there a delay: there would not in this case be the confusion on Capitol Hill which, to judge by the comments of individual senators, will inevitably arise when two treaties—START-1 and START-2—end up in Congress simultaneously. A result of the confusion would be the fact of the debate then being protracted for a very long time and START-1 not taking effect for a long time.

If everything goes according to plan, however, then, as Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, predicts, "we will have done with START-1 in October."

And, second: Cheney and Powell categorically disagreed with the senators who demanded either the administration's complete abandonment of nuclear testing or an appreciable reduction in it. "If Congress were to pass a bill limiting or banning nuclear testing," Cheney said, "I would recommend that the President use his veto and block this law." According to information given by the secretary, the United States would not, in accordance with Bush's new policy, conduct more than six tests a year.

The Senate, however, is in an emphatic frame of mind: As Sam Nunn declared, the administration, "whose policy is failing to keep abreast of present-day realities—the reduction in nuclear tension"—should limit the number of tests even more, otherwise Congress will do this for it.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Russia Said Unready for ABM Cooperation With United States

924P0148A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 20, 13-19 May 92 p 11

[Article by Aleksandr Radionov under the "Professional's Opinion" rubric: "A Bridle for the Nuclear Race Horses: We Are Applying for the SDI, It Would Seem. But With What, Pray?"]

[Text] For a good 10 years we considered the SDI program the focal point of conjecture, literary speculation and scientific skepticism, outdoing in such opinions, at times, even the Americans. The statement of the patriarchs of our science on the futility of this venture of President R. Reagan was heard for the first time back in the spring of 1983. Compellingly and cogently. And several months later, relying on the opinion of their own scientists, the Americans concluded the first contracts for the development of a space-based ABM system and determined its proposed structure, the extent of the financing and the timeframe of performance of the work.

After this, we, like mating birds, continued to hear only our own song, clearly afraid of missing a beat in our ten-year-old song. But in August of 1991 we missed a beat nonetheless. And we even changed the nature and tone of our former arguments. Timorously at first, but then with increasing insistence, academic circles in Russia began to ask admission to SDI, persuading President B. Yeltsin of the possibility of Russian-American cooperation in this field.

It is, let us state plainly, not a bad idea, were it not for a number of circumstances.

First, however attractive our scientists' proposals, they are fearfully far removed from real life. It is finally time to understand that the SDI is now far from being an initiative and is, rather, a system, a decision on whose deployment could be adopted in the very near future.

And, as is known, without our involvement. Second, what about the asymmetrical version, which even yesterday was preferable to us? Who will pay for the years and for Russia's intellectual and material potential, which were expended to no purpose?

Nonetheless, judging by scientists' pronouncements, there are more than enough arguments in support of a rapid reorientation of views. Some, for example, believe that it is possible even now to embark on the creation of a joint system for the monitoring of outer space and warning of a missile attack. Fortunately, both sides have mutually complementary components of such a system. There is also, it would seem, a readiness for this on the part of some of our military also. As the authoritative American journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY related at the beginning of March, they have already addressed a specific proposal to the headquarters of the U.S. Joint Space Command.

Others are intent on interesting future partners in the ABM system around Moscow inasmuch as its S-300 ABM interceptor batteries have evoked interest on the arms market and, as they maintain, are comparable with the American Patriot.

Yet others are putting the emphasis on the possibility of the enlistment of Energiya rockets, the world's most powerful, for launching clusters of American satellites into orbit. There is also talk of our "inexpensive" Zenits and Protons.

There are also proposals for the organization on a regular basis of the exchange of data of space reconnaissance with the subsequent integration of national technical facilities of Russia and the United States in a single reconnaissance-information system.

The proposals, which are undoubtedly interesting and not devoid of common sense, impose considerable obligations. They presuppose, as a minimum, the adequacy of the scientific approaches to the object of cooperation and the comparability of the engineering designs and operational specifications of the national technical means of verification and also the parties' mutual interest. Which do not, unfortunately, exist.

And what adequacy could there be if even today, while having recognized the expediency of cooperation in a previously prohibited sphere, we are continuing to uphold the hopelessly obsolete concept of the Moscow region ABM defenses, whose counterpart, Safeguard, the United States stood down back in 1975, admitting that it was not only ineffective, but also presented a radiation threat in the event of its use.

Nor is the situation the best when it comes to our technology. We are continuing to "catch" on our radar screens the flashing dots of airborne targets. They, on the other hand, are ready to deploy radars depicting the silhouettes of the targets being observed. They have elements of machine graphics and artificial intelligence at work here. We, old-style, have an operator-plotter.

And what about reconnaissance-information exchange, the joint monitoring of outer space, and the reciprocal notification of a possible missile attack? The Americans would not agree to this, they would not!

This is the elite part of the United States' military astronautics and its sacred object and national pride, to which they have no intention of admitting even their closest allies, not to mention yesterday's enemies. Evidence of this are the events in the Persian Gulf, when the United States supplied its forces on the ground with space reconnaissance information literally 12 minutes after it was collected. And the allies obtained only information doled out with a 24-hour delay. Offended by this approach, France resolved to speed up the creation of an all-European space-based reconnaissance system. It was supported by Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. We, on the other hand, having our own space reconnaissance facilities, are orienting ourselves on matters of interaction only toward the Americans, it would seem. In vain, I believe.

Cooperation is also quite illusory in other issues. Be it the monitoring of outer space or the warning of missile launches from foreign territory. The Americans learned to do this earlier and better than us.

Our warning systems were oriented toward a massive ICBM attack mainly from the territory of the United States. The Americans, on the other hand, placed under surveillance all areas of the planet where there was a missile threat, and tracked from space even individual operational-tactical missile launches.

We consider the national air defense system a reliable "bridle for foreign nuclear race horses". But according to R. McNamara, American experts find it "full of holes" and vulnerable to fighter bombers and cruise missiles. And they "agree, on the whole, that the billions of dollars which the Soviets spent on air defense in the past two decades were for the most part thrown away to no avail." An example of this is the Duga over-the-horizon radar, which has been abandoned because of the scientific groundlessness of the idea itself.

Nor are things as felicitous as we would like with the monitoring of outer space either. The Americans can "see" space objects with the dimensions of a football at an altitude of 40,000 km. What is more, on any spot on the Earth, be it on the territory of the United States or the Crimea Peninsula or above Venezuela or the Hawaiian Islands. Our capabilities, however, are confined to the geographical coordinates of Russia and altogether exclude any monitoring of spacecraft in orbits at an inclination of less than 38 degrees.

As we can see, there is a multitude of discrepancies in the chain of paradoxes which we have engendered. Of both a global and local nature. Whence the reasonable and now-anthologized question: "What is to be done?"

For a start, in my view, it would be no bad thing to ponder the following words of a scientific leader of the

SDI: "The more the engineering difficulties we have to overcome, the greater the assurance that the SDI is a far from idle undertaking." We would then, possibly, recognize at the axiomatic level that the SDI is more an objective natural development [zakonomernost] than an annoying happenstance and could switch to the question: "With what to begin?"

The same way the Americans have begun—with the latest space technology and the formation of independent expert groups to study the technical-economic, military-strategic and international-legal aspects of this problem. They had three groups. We, however, would have to form a fourth! For an analysis of the reasons for the appearance of the SDI and the results achieved in the course of its realization.

And for this we would have to turn to the sources. The point being that at the end of the 1970's the United States had begun to yield its positions in the field of science-intensive technology and to lose control over the business activity of Japan, West Europe, and Israel. A solution was needed—a bold and decisive and compelling argument for a regrouping of science and production forces.

The SDI was the "ideological keystone" which without special expenditure and efforts inclined the world's leading powers to voluntarily place at the disposal of the United States their intellectual potential and their latest technology. Unimpeded and unprecedentedly cheap access to world scientific thought enabled the Americans to release part of their own scientific resources and concentrate them in insufficiently explored and, at times, surprising directions of the proposed technological breakthrough: advanced nuclear power engineering, high-energy laser technology, biotechnology, research in the sphere of antimatter, plasma physics, and gravitational and magnetic field theory. But overseas participants were not admitted to this type of work, as a rule, on the specious excuse of secrecy restrictions.

As far, however, as reasons of a purely military nature are concerned, they are undoubtedly present and are expressed, of course, in the structure of a space-based ABM-interceptor defensive point. And there were explanations here also. The point being that the world had been shocked by the strategic arms overkill syndrome. The nuclear powers had become hostages to the law of "diminishing returns". The more resources they allocated for the development of weapons systems, the more illusory hopes for superiority became. Speaking of a continued buildup of strategic arsenals had become politically pointless, and even militarily-strategically dangerous. The Americans deemed it prudent to speak about defense. At first about strategic defense and then, having won the support of their partners, about tactical defense also. In addition, the United States was clearly

intimidated by the growth in the number of states wishing to become members of the club of nuclear powers, a considerable number of which either have unstable regimes or are located in areas of geostrategic significance. And once again logic suggested to the Americans more reliable defenses rather than an offensive threat.

Such, if you will, was the general intent of the strategic initiative of the 41st president of the United States. Its development into so unique a program and arrival at the present stage of realization were possible thanks to the competitive selection of research projects, the absence of lack of coordination between different departments, the close linkage of the ideas in development with the overall structure of military-space systems, and the strict centralization of the country's military astronautics. But this is what we unfortunately do not yet have.

U.S.-Russian Talks on Global Defense Proposal

Outlook for Talks

OW1107181592 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1535 GMT 11 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] As INTERFAX has been informed at Russia's Foreign Ministry, an American delegation will arrive in Moscow on Monday, July 13, led by the Undersecretary of State Dennis Ross "for an exchange of opinions on bilateral relations".

Prospects will be discussed for creating a system of global defence based on the former "star wars" programme. Russia is ready to join the United States for that programme.

Russian and American experts are expected to consider setting up an early warning centre that could also be used for exchanging technologies.

The Russian delegation will be led by the Deputy-Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov handling the relations with the United States. The talks will also be attended by officers from Russia's Defence Ministry and scientists, such as the leading authority in space technology Yevgeniy Velikhov, member of the Academy of Sciences.

The Foreign Ministry's official has told INTERFAX that the coming talks are seen as very important not only by the Russian, but also the American side. This is seen from the fact that the American delegation is led by D. Ross.

The diplomat explained that D. Ross, as Undersecretary of State heading the planning department, is James Baker's close assistant.

Talks Begin

*LD1307175892 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1640 GMT 13 Jul 92*

[Text] Moscow, 13 Jul (ITAR-TASS)—In accordance with the joint Russian-U.S. statement signed during the recent visit to Washington by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, high-level bilateral consultations with regard to studying practical steps to elaborate a mutually acceptable world community global defense system began today.

According to a report by the Russian Foreign Ministry Department of Information and the Press, Georgiy Mamedov, Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs, heads the delegation of the Russian Federation, and Dennis Ross, chief of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State, heads the U.S. delegation.

Dennis Ross was also received today by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. The most topical bilateral and international questions were discussed, in particular how to rapidly settle armed conflicts in Yugoslavia and on the territory of the CIS.

Text of Joint Statement

*LD1507104292 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0845 GMT 15 Jul 92*

[Text] Moscow, 15 Jul (ITAR-TASS)—Follows the full text of the joint statement on the establishment of a global ballistic missile defense system:

Top-level Russian and U.S. delegations met in Moscow on 13-14 July to discuss the issue of establishing a global ballistic missile defense system.

These consultations grew out of the accord reached between Presidents B.N. Yeltsin and G. Bush in the course of the Washington summit. Both presidents agreed that our two countries must work with their allies and other interested states with the aim of developing a concept of a global defense system as part of a general strategy of counteracting the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

The two presidents agreed to study the following as a priority:

- the potential for information exchange on early warning for ballistic missile launches by setting up an early warning center;
- the potential for cooperation with participating states in the development of means and technologies for a ballistic missile defense; and
- the matter of working out a legal basis for cooperation, including new treaties and agreements and possible changes in existing agreements necessary for the implementation of a global defense system.

The delegations held constructive and fruitful discussions on all relevant matters. They agreed that both

countries are facing a radically changed situation in the field of security, characterized by the end of the military confrontation of the "cold war" period and by the change in the nature of threats to international security, including the growing threat to the world community created by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. They agreed that they need to collaborate with each other and with other interested states with the goal of finding solutions to these new tasks by studying the potential advantages of a global ballistic missile defense system. They also agreed on the importance of studying the role of defense in ensuring protection from limited missile attacks.

Both sides believe that their discussions have created a promising basis for further work. They have decided to set up three working groups within which specialists will immediately begin to tackle the tasks of developing an outline of a global defense system.

The working group on developing an outline of a global defense system will examine the question of the structure, specific features, and functions of a global defense system. It will study the concept of a global defense system and analyze the relationships between the main elements of such a system. Subgroups will be set up as required within the framework of the working group, including subgroups on research and outlines, early warning, and cooperation in the field of tactical ballistic missile defense.

A working group on cooperation in the field of technology will examine possible scientific research, experimental design work projects, the conduct of tests, and other forms of technological cooperation which would assist in the implementation of the idea of a global defense system, where possible in cooperation with other states. This group's work should reflect the activity of the working group on the outline.

A working group on nonproliferation will produce joint assessments of trends in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. It will also study ways and means of building up existing international efforts to prevent such proliferation as well as the question of future initiatives in this area.

Both sides agreed that the working groups will hold their first sessions soon. They also agreed that a high-level group will continue to take the leading role and periodically hold meetings to examine matters entrusted to it by Presidents B.N. Yeltsin and G. Bush in their 17 June statement. Both sides plan to provide the leadership of both countries with a report on the efforts being made in the near future.

Newspaper Sums Up Provisions

*PM1607154192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jul 92 p 3*

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Press Service: "On the Approaches to GPALS"]

[Text] Moscow and Washington have started implementing the recent understanding by the two countries' presidents on studying the possibilities for creating a Global Protection Against Limited Strikes [GPALS]

system. High-level Russian and U.S. delegations held consultations 13 and 14 July in Moscow.

In a joint statement adopted on the results of the discussion, the sides noted the growing threat to the world community posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. They stressed the need for cooperation in order to find solutions to new tasks of ensuring security. These solutions may be found in the creation of a GPALS system.

Both sides believe that a basis for further work, which will be carried out by three working groups, has been created as a result of the discussions. One of the groups will examine the question of the structure, features, and functions of GPALS. At the same time the concept of global protection will be studied, and mutual relations between the basic elements of such a system will be analyzed. The working group on cooperation in the sphere of technology will examine possible research and development projects and the carrying out of experiments as well as other forms of technological cooperation which could assist in the implementation of GPALS. Finally, a working group for nonproliferation will assess trends in the sphere of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms delivery vehicles, and will study ways and means to avert such proliferation.

These groups should start work in the near future.

'Diplomat' Comments

*OW1507124592 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1213 GMT 15 Jul 92*

[From "Diplomatic Panorama" by diplomatic correspondent I. Porshnev; transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpts] Russia and the USA concluded their consultations in Moscow with the decision to set up 3 working groups to deal with practical issues connected with the efforts to create a global defence system. The Russian delegation at the consultations was led by Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov and the American by Undersecretary of State Dennis Ross, J. Baker's closest assistant. [passage omitted]

It's Not Too Hard To Adjust the Russian and American Concepts of Global Defence System, But This Will Require Additional Work

When asked by Diplomatic Panorama's correspondent to comment on the Russian-American statement, a high-ranking Russian diplomat who monitors relations with the USA has said that the consultations held in Moscow revealed both similarity and differences in the two countries' approaches to a number of issues.

According to the diplomat, the fact that the two sides realize the need for creating a global defence system which any other nation could join is of fundamental importance. Nevertheless the principles on which such a

system could be joined are to be devised yet by the working groups set up in Moscow.

The experts are to define the functions of a joint international center for global defence in whose work the representatives of Russia and other countries would take part. This proposal was made by the Americans. "It means a step forward as compared with the initial idea of setting up an early warning center", the Russian diplomat said.

Nevertheless the talks in Moscow reveal certain differences which concern primarily two key issues.

First of all, Russia cannot agree with America's striving to build a system of global defence based on its own anti-missile system that would control Russian missile systems.

Secondly, Russia is "particularly concerned" over America's striving to revise the treaty on anti-missile defences and remove elements the Russian defence system is based on from it.

"The Americans suggest that the concept of a global system of defence against ballistic missiles should be worked out on the basis of anti-missile defences, but with departure from the treaty on anti-missile defence. As for Russia, it opposes this and calls for creating a global system of defence against any attacks", the Russian expert said.

In other words, he pointed out, at the moment there are two concepts of a global defence system: a Russian and an American. "It's not too hard to adjust them, since both sides are willing to work on this project". Besides, they realize that a global defence system must comprise a network of warning sensors and a system of interception.

Deputy Foreign Minister Comments

*LD1707145792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1432 GMT 17 Jul 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Oleg Polovko and Igor Shubin]

[Text] Moscow July 17 TASS—The creation of a global defence system which Russia and the United States have agreed upon does not call for amendments in the ABM Treaty, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov said at a briefing on Friday [17 July].

Russia believes the treaty has not lost its importance and acts as the "basis of strategic stability" in conditions of radical reduction of strategic offensive arms, he stressed.

But the U.S. side has a different approach to the matter, however, it did not prevent the Russian-U.S. delegations at talks on the global defence system to adopt "constructive decisions" which testify to a high level of mutual understanding between the two states, according to Berdennikov.

He was commenting on the first meeting of the Russian-U.S. group discussing the global defence system which took place in Moscow on July 13-14.

The results of the meeting became "a material confirmation" to the end of the cold war, he stressed.

It was agreed to create three working groups which will deal with practical aspects of the system. The first one will be in charge of its concept, the second one will deal with cooperation in the field of technologies, while the third one will solve the issues of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, according to Berdennikov.

The global defence system is not aimed against anyone concretely, it will protect the world community from "unexpected circumstances" he added.

Japan Said to Link Kurils, GPALS Role

924P0151A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by V. Bantin: "Geopolitics: The United States Is Inviting Japan to Participate in a New SDI; Tokyo Does Not Want to Work Alongside Russia Because of Dispute over the Fate of the Southern Kurils"]

[Text] The United States is inviting Japan to take part in the creation of the "Global Protection Against Limited Strikes System" (GPALS), which is a revised version of the American "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI). The Japanese newspaper SANKEI SHIMBUN reports that according to sources close to the U.S. Administration, this proposal is contained in a special personal message from U.S. President George Bush, which was delivered recently to Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa. In his response, the head of the Japanese Cabinet of Ministers declared Tokyo's intention "to study the question of the possibility of participation" by Japan in this program.

The idea of the creation of GPALS was proposed at the beginning of last year by the U.S. President after the American "Patriot" antiaircraft missile complexes proved their effectiveness in destroying Iraqi ballistic missiles during combat operations in the Persian Gulf. The primary purpose of GPALS is to provide protection for the United States and its allies against potential missile strikes from countries such as Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, which are trying to acquire their own atomic weapons—unlike the considerably more expensive "Star Wars" program, or SDI, which was intended to destroy nuclear missiles of the former USSR with the help of space weapons.

According to American sources, Washington believes that the implementation of such a program is in the interests not only of the United States, but of a whole group of other states as well, which have the necessary technological potential and financial resources, Japan in particular. One factor that is keeping Japan from giving

the United States a final answer is, specifically, the concern on the part of official Tokyo that joining the American program could cause an outburst of criticism in the country directed at the government: Such a step contradicts the interpretation accepted here of the postwar constitution, and also Tokyo's "three nuclear-free principles," which prohibit the shipping of weapons abroad. But SANKEI SHIMBUN claims that the main reason for Japan's concern over participation in the GPALS program may well be Russia's proposed inclusion in it. There is a danger that Tokyo will be forced to cooperate with Moscow "while the problem of the 'northern territories' remains unresolved," the newspaper notes. Behind this is hidden a direct allusion to the fact that official Tokyo is still adhering to the "principle of political and economic isolation" in its relations with Moscow, which makes the possibility of full-scale cooperation between Japan and Russia conditional on the transfer of the Southern Kurils to Tokyo's jurisdiction.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Ukrainian Official Cited on Republic's Military Power

LD0207192292 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1800 GMT 2 Jul 92

[Text] The Ukrainian Foreign Minister [as heard] Borys Tarasyuk has said that his country will remain Europe's second biggest military power after Russia, even after the considerable reduction of its Army in keeping with the conventional armed forces treaty. The Ukrainian parliament was second in the CIS to have ratified the treaty envisaging the elimination of 5,000 pieces of military equipment in Ukraine.

We would like to see Ukraine strong in economic than in military terms; Mr. Tarasyuk said, however, we have received this heritage from the Soviet Union and are going to make use of it in a proper way. Currently, Ukraine can equip ground and air forces superior to those of Germany, France, or Britain.

Pact on Conventional Force Ceilings Viewed

PM1007092592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Jul 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Sergey Tosunyan: "European States Reducing Armies From Atlantic to Urals"]

[Text] The participants in the Vienna CFE talks have completed work on preparing the agreement whose official title is: Final Act on Conventional Force Strengths. The act was initialed on 6 July and has been sent to Helsinki, where the meeting of CSCE countries' heads of state and government opens 9 July.

This is the first time in history that a large number of states have voluntarily pledged to keep armies strictly limited in size. Ground forces, air forces, and air defense forces are subject to restriction, as are naval formations

and land-based units. Restrictions do not apply to troops performing internal security functions in peacetime and personnel serving under UN command.

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg will have the lowest troop level—900 soldiers. The Danish and Norwegian Armies will have just over 30,000 men. The Russian Federation may keep 1,450,000 men on its European territory. There must be no more than 250,000 U.S. servicemen in Europe.

I asked Ambassador Vladimir Shustov, leader of the Russian delegation at the Vienna talks, to describe how the agreement was prepared and the significance of the document for the disarmament process on the continent.

The agreement was the result of arduous talks lasting many months, he said. Its main aim is to set national limits on the size of the conventional forces of states in Europe. Essentially, this is an unprecedented accord reached by a large number of states including such leading military countries as Russia, the United States, Germany, France, and Britain. In all, 29 countries took part in the talks, including eight republics of the former USSR. The general opinion is that this agreement is a significant supplement to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe signed in Paris 19 November 1990, which sets ceilings on the main types of arms—tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, warplanes, and helicopter gunships.

In our view, the important political point of the agreement is that as a result of it all the member states are assuming a political commitment to limit the size of their conventional forces on a national level. Russia has set its figure at 1,450,000. Under the accord, this ceiling will be achieved in 40 months. The agreement applies to the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. For Russia, this means its territory west of the Urals.

Conditions are the same for all states. No one will suffer and no one receives unilateral advantages. Previously only one country—Germany—had a national level, as laid down by the well known “two plus four” agreement. Its ground troop level is 345,000 men. This fact itself contained a certain potential danger because it enabled some political forces in Germany to claim demagogically that their country was suffering discrimination. Now there will be no grounds for arguments of that kind.

The fairly lengthy implementation timetable provided by the agreement will make it possible to reorganize our armed forces painlessly. For Russia the agreement is important because it will regulate our mutual relations in the military-political sphere not only with the European countries, the United States, and Canada but also with the former republics of the USSR at the same time.

In the text of the agreement it is not only each word which is well considered but each comma and period. On a whole series of questions the Russian delegation has taken a firm stand and has made no compromises. Our partners in the talks understood that.

Russian Parliament Ratifies CFE Treaty, Implementation Accord

Supreme Soviet Resolution

OW0807113492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1047 GMT 8 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Wednesday [8 July] the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation ratified the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] dated November 19, 1990 and an Agreement on principles and procedures of implementing the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

The resolution on this issue urges the Russian government to speed up the negotiations with the participation of the representatives of the Russian Parliament with the CIS countries, Azerbaijan and Georgia to define the reduction quatum, the inspection activity, and norms for dividing expenditures in realization of this Treaty.

The government is to develop a plan for reorganization of the armed forces stationed in Europe before October 1992 assuring security of Russia.

Deputy Defense Minister Reports

LD0807121592 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 8 Jul 92

[From the “Vesti” newscast]

[Text] The Russian Parliament has ratified the Paris Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] signed in November 1990 and the agreement on the order of its implementation. Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Mironov gave a report on this question.

He emphasized that, despite the great reductions of troops and equipment, the treaty does not infringe the security of Russia and it promote the establishment of the new structure of its armed forces. The general also drew attention to the problems of expenditure on the destruction of weapons, and in connection with this he asked parliament to allocate further resources from the budget.

After an interval the deputies adopted a resolution on the fulfillment of international obligations in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and went on to the second reading of the draft law on foreign intelligence.

Outlines Reductions

OW0807143092 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1313 GMT 8 Jul 92

[From “Diplomatic Panorama”: “Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe Doesn’t Undermine Russia’s Security”; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Wednesday, July 8, Russia's parliament ratified the treaty on conventional forces in Europe signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, and the agreement on the principles and procedure of its implementation signed in Tashkent on May 15, 1992.

"The treaty can by no means be considered as a document undermining this country's security", Russia's Deputy Defence Minister Lt.-General Valeriy Mironov told the parliament. The treaty, he pointed out, draws nearer "the prospects for creating a reliable and comprehensive system of European security, based on trust and cooperation between all European countries, the USA and Canada, not on military might".

V. Mironov reaffirmed Russia's intention to build its armed forces based on the principle of "reasonable sufficiency". "Considering the present socio-political situation in the CIS, for Russia it's inexpedient and economically burdensome to maintain numerous armed forces", Russia's Deputy Defence Minister stressed.

According to him, the process of reforming the armed forces of the former USSR and building Russia's own army will take 8 years (up to 2000). By 1995 the number of troops is to be reduced from 2.8 million to 2.1 million men, and to 1.5 million by the year 2000. This fully conforms to the bill on defence adopted by Russia's parliament under which the number of Russian troops should not exceed 1% of the country's population.

According to V. Mironov, in the process of implementing the treaty "the older types of arms and military equipment will be scrapped in the first place".

"Russia acquires the status of Europe's leading state in politico-military terms", V. Mironov pointed out. Under the treaty Russia is entitled to maintain 280,600 units of weapons and military equipment: over 2.5 times more than the quantity of arms and equipment belonging to any other European country.

Besides, said V. Mironov, Russia will continue to have the opportunity to keep "powerful enough" army reserves in the areas not covered by the treaty, such as the Urals and Siberia.

Foreign Ministry Official Comments

LD0807162992 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1320 GMT 8 Jul 92

[Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov by correspondent Lyudmila Semina at the Russian Supreme Soviet in Moscow on 8 July—recorded]

[Text] [Semina] It was underlined at the [Russian Supreme Soviet] session that it is very important that Russia ratifies this treaty.

[Berdennikov] The point is that all the NATO states and all our former Warsaw Treaty allies, and, moreover, practically all CIS states and Georgia have already ratified this treaty. Byelarus has not yet done so for technical reasons, since their Supreme Soviet is currently in recess, and the situation with regard to the ratification in Armenia is not exactly clear. All the others have ratified it. So the whole world watched whether we would ratify this exceptionally important treaty, fundamental for building the edifice of security in Europe. The fact is that this treaty is indeed laying the foundation of this edifice; it creates a sort of net that would make it impossible to concentrate arms for a sudden attack, for conducting military aggression. Besides, the treaty contains a monitoring system that cannot be circumvented. The levels that the treaty sets will undoubtedly be reached by the states; if somebody attempts to infringe them, he will be caught red-handed, as the saying goes. That is why this treaty is extremely important. The continuation of the European process as a whole depended upon its ratification by Russia.

Tomorrow the Helsinki summit begins, as you know, and if we had come to this meeting not having ratified this treaty, Russia's authority would have been considerably undermined. That is why the Supreme Soviet's decision is extremely positive and important both for our country and the whole of Europe and the world.

[Semina] You know the arguments of the opponents of the ratification of the treaty that were brought up quite often both in the parliament and in the mass media, namely that Russia was losing its military power, that we are disarming ourselves.

[Berdennikov] No, no, I would attribute all that to emotions. Russia remains the biggest military power in Europe. According to this treaty, even taking into consideration the division of arms between the heirs to the Soviet Union, Russia has 50 percent of the total number of airplanes compared with all NATO countries, for example, and about 40 percent of tanks. Therefore, our safety, in our view—which coincides completely with the opinion of the Defense Ministry—will undoubtedly be well protected and secured by those levels of arms that we will retain. As for the probability of conducting a war, as I said, it will be decreased, and our security is thereby increased.

[Semina] And the pressures on our economy will be considerably lessened.

[Berdennikov] That goes without saying. As a matter of fact, the alternative to this treaty would have amounted to a resumed arms race and military confrontation in Europe. Under the present circumstances, I really do not see how we could bear a new arms race. Therefore, this is the only correct and badly needed step in the current situation.

Yeltsin, Walesa Discuss Troop Withdrawal*LD0907154192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1329 GMT 9 Jul 92*

[Excerpts] Helsinki, 9 July (ITAR-TASS)—The all-European summit meeting which has opened in the Finnish capital includes not only speeches by heads of states from the rostrum of the forum but also high-pressure work behind the scenes. [passage omitted]

A conversation also took place between Boris Yeltsin and Polish President Lech Walesa. Vyacheslav Kostikov, the Russian president's press secretary, briefed the press on the meeting. According to Kostikov, while remembering his recent visit to Moscow, Walesa described it as a good and strong beginning and stressed that Poland wants to move alongside Russia in the future. As old neighbors, Walesa stressed, we would ideally like to have relations with Russia based on the principles of close cooperation.

Yeltsin agreed with the way Walesa formulated the issue; that the time has come to move from political declarations and statements about intentions to solve specific problems in relations between the two countries. The first group of problems is connected with the withdrawal of Russian troops from Poland, whereas the second problem relates to the restoration and development of cooperation in the economic sphere.

Also under discussion was the question of convening a Russian-Polish economic conference as early as August. The two presidents agreed that the conference must be convened regardless of the pace at which the Polish Government is formed. The venue for the conference was also discussed. It will be held in Kaliningrad. Gaydar will possibly chair it. The Polish side expressed great satisfaction over the fact that an agreement on the withdrawal of troops has been signed with Russia. True, several complex problems, which are somewhat similar in nature to the problems of the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic Republics, still remain. In other words, there is a political solution.

Both sides reached full understanding but the construction of housing for the contingents which are being withdrawn is proceeding very slowly. The Polish side put forward a very interesting proposal. It intends to display its own initiative and ask the West to allocate social funds for the construction of housing for the military. What is involved is not the credits but direct subventions. This will naturally create conditions for the faster withdrawal of troops from Poland. Yeltsin proposed that in respect to Poland, "the zero option" should be repeated, as far as property and mutual claims are concerned; that is, that the same actions which were taken in the withdrawal of troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia should be taken. Yeltsin agreed with the fact that it would be ridiculous to scrap the airports and other major sites. It would be better to take this Russian

military property into account when the damages caused by the presence of troops to the environment are calculated. [passage omitted]

Latvian Chairman Demands Russian Troop Withdrawal*LD1007212592 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
0800 GMT 10 Jul 92*

["Excerpt" of speech by Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council, at the CSCE summit in Helsinki—recorded]

[Text] Latvia is now a full participating member in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. [Words indistinct] to fulfill the obligations (?placed on it here) by the principles (?implied in) the Helsinki process, Latvia (?is entitled) to expect that the participant states in the process will assist it in solving its problems, which are disrupting the sure evolution of democracy and the path of economic reform. We are convinced that a fundamental obstacle to our democratic development is the illegal presence of the former Soviet army—illegal because it was deployed without asking consent, and even to this day it has not concluded an agreement on the schedule and the deadline for its withdrawal from the territory of the Baltic countries.

There cannot be any normal political, economic, or national development if threats exist to our own sovereignty. In this context it must be said that in the inhabitants of Latvia, intolerance and interethnic tension is exacerbated by the fact that in Latvia there are many more foreign military personnel to each person than in any other country in Europe. In the eyes of the native population of Latvia the Soviet Army is associated with the deportations and the colonization of the Baltic lands carried out by the communist regime. As a result of this a demographic situation has arisen which is hard for citizens who have lived for decades in western democracies to understand. Latvians have become a minority in their own homeland. Likewise, the Latvian language is threatened, too. That is why the efforts to raise the slogan of the western democracies which speaks of defending the people who speak Russian with the assistance of the Army are viewed with cynicism. It all places us in humiliating dependence on the political fluctuations in neighboring countries. We cannot hope for the vitally necessary investments in the economy as long as there is political instability in the country because of the presence of a foreign army.

Our basic position at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is characterized by these (?factors): First, we hope that the Helsinki final documents will emphasize that the presence of foreign troops in the Baltic countries is contrary to the basic principles of international law. Second, it will be necessary to be aware that the presence of the troops is not merely an internal problem of the Baltic countries but is a threat to the security of Europe as a whole. Third, we hope that the participant states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will support the demands of the Balts to conclude, in accordance with the basic principles of international law, a bilateral treaty on the speedy,

monitorable, and complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic countries. As well as this, these treaties must contain strict schedules for the withdrawal of the army.

Latvia has followed the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe with great attention and the resolve of the conference to solve possible conflicts at their very initial stage and to create mechanisms to avoid them. For a long time the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will have to concern itself with the security problems created by the uncontrolled activity of the troops of collapsed or collapsing empires on the territories of their constituent states.

In this connection the cooperation confirmed in the 1992 Helsinki documents with the United Nations Organization and other international organizations on matters of security is completely necessary, especially because the CSCE lacks an effective mechanism to solve the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova, and other potentially tragic areas.

Does the still changing, very unstable appearance of the new Europe not yet demand a stronger mechanism of security within the framework of the CSCE itself? Let us hope that the future will not force us to return to this question on which the future fate of the Helsinki process depends to a large extent.

Everything that has been said is very significant for the Baltic people; the Baltic people's faith in the effectiveness of democracy depends on what has been said because according to the Paris Charter, security in our time is not divisible, and the security of each participant state is indivisibly linked to the security of the other states.

In signing the final documents of the Helsinki conference, we support it fully.

Estonia's Ruutel Demands Russian Troop Withdrawal

To CSCE: Threat to North Europe Security

*OW1007055092 Moscow BALTFAX in English
0518 GMT 10 Jul 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The withdrawal of Russian forces from Baltic states is not merely a matter between Russia and the Baltic governments; further presence of the forces is a threat to the security of northern Europe, Speaker of the Estonian Parliament Arnold Ruutel said at the opening of the Helsinki Conference Wednesday [8 July]. "European nations should think about what the purpose of these forces is", he said.

Mr. Ruutel said Estonia is counting on the CSCE for help in obtaining the withdrawal of foreign forces from the republic.

Meets With Yeltsin, Kozyrev

*OW1007062692 Moscow BALTFAX in English
0518 GMT 10 Jul 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Speaker of the Estonian Parliament Arnold Ruutel Thursday [9 July] met with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev at the CSCE conference in the Finnish capital.

Mr. Ruutel briefed the Russian leaders on the Estonian plan for the withdrawal of Russian forces from the republic. Estonia's plan states that Russia has one year to withdraw military units from Tallinn, as well as strategic units and mobile technology from Estonia. Estonia is willing to permit a delay in the withdrawal of high tech equipment, whose dismantling requires much time.

The head of the Estonian Parliament also proposed that a portion of the credits Russia will receive from the World Bank and the IMF, be directed to forming the social pretexts to withdraw servicemen from the Baltic states. Mr. Ruutel said that several Estonian firms are willing to build housing for the servicemen in Russia in exchange for these funds.

Lithuania Seeks Russian Troop Pullout at CSCE Summit

CSCE Declaration Urges Pullout

*LD1007121292 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 10 Jul 92*

[Excerpt] One hour ago, the heads of states at the Helsinki CSCE summit signed a concluding document of the meeting, a political declaration, and a summary of the Helsinki decisions.

As you know, the 15th paragraph of the declaration, which contains 80 pages, demands that the army under Russia's jurisdiction in the Baltic states be withdrawn as soon possible, orderly and completely, and that an agreement should be reached on the date of the withdrawal. [passage omitted]

Commentary on Final Document

*LD1307120792 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International
Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 10 Jul 92*

[Text] Thanks to the efforts of Baltic representatives, the Helsinki Final Document, which was signed today in the capital, includes a paragraph in which the assertion is made that an army of a signatory to the act may only be present in the territory of another act signatory with its prior consent.

By signing the Helsinki Final Document, Lithuania exercised its right to read a statement of interpretation. It concerned Paragraph 15 of the final document, alluding to the withdrawal of the foreign army from the Baltic countries.

The fact of the presence of a foreign army within the Baltic states, as mentioned in the Final Act, demonstrates the fact that this question is not bilateral but is instead a question of international law.

The document also notes that responsibility for the 1940 aggression against and occupation of Lithuania, that is, the responsibility for the arrival and continued presence of a foreign army in Lithuania, rests with the country whose rights and obligations have been inherited by Russia. This must also be recalled when discussing reparation for the damages inflicted upon Lithuania, the document says. In the 14 June referendum, the Lithuanian people demanded that reparations be made for the damages caused by the Soviet presence in Lithuania.

Landsbergis Holds Press Conference

*OW1307231992 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1634 GMT 13 Jul 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Speaking at today's press conference in Vilnius, head of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis quoted Article 15 of the Helsinki Political Declaration, as requiring "immediate coordination of timetables for a rapid, organized, and unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic countries". The Lithuanian leader made a special emphasis on the efforts the Swedish and Finnish governments had gone to in order to select the right wording for this clause to satisfy the demands of the Lithuanian side. Mr Landsbergis avers that based on the results of the referendum conducted on June 14 regarding the pullout of the Russian troops from the territory of Lithuania and proceeding from provisions of the Helsinki document, the army of the former Soviet Union from Lithuania should leave the country this year.

In the words of the head of the Lithuanian parliament, on the last day of the Helsinki summit Russian President Boris Yeltsin, in an informal discussion, conceded that as regards the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Baltics, "It would be necessary to work out their withdrawal timetable and go ahead with it."

Mr Landsbergis observed that in the course of their meeting with George Bush, the leaders of the Baltic states pledged that the US President would be regularly briefed on the movements and other operations of Russian troops on the territory of the Baltic countries.

Mr Landsbergis also indicated that beginning this week, the Lithuanian experts in cooperation with their Ukrainian counterparts will start preparing friendship, cooperation and trade agreements between the two countries. The sides claim to expedite the procedures for nullifying their mutual debt. A tentative agreement in that regard was reached in Helsinki during Mr Landsbergis' meeting with Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk.

Yeltsin Cited on 'Necessity' of Withdrawal

*LD1407200392 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English
2300 GMT 13 Jul 92*

[Text] As Vytautas Landsbergis pointed out, during the meeting on the last day of the Helsinki conference the Russian President Boris Yeltsin has agreed on the necessity of making and conforming the Army withdrawal schedule and starting the withdrawal itself.

Vytautas Landsbergis also noted that in the meeting with the U.S. President Bush and leaders of the Baltic states it has been decided to supply information about Russian Army's movements and activity in the Baltics.

In the opinion of Vytautas Landsbergis, it was obvious that President George Bush was unaware of some essential details connected with Russian Army's presence in the Baltics.

Landsbergis on Relations With Russia

*LD1807135592 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 16 Jul 92*

[Statement by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, followed by questions and answers session at news conference in Supreme Council building, Vilnius, on 16 July—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Landsbergis] Reports are reaching us about the debate in the Russian parliament on an issue which had been raised, namely the so-called human rights problem in the neighboring states, in this case in the Baltic states, and the information received about how these issues are worded. Therefore, it seems to me that some comment should be made here before comments are made by our relevant commissions or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Judging from what we know from mass media reports, it looks as though this reflects a general strengthening of the reactionary forces in the parliament of the Russian Federation. A positive concept can also be seen in this debate, although expressed in some peculiar manner: while making reproaches for failing to adhere to the timetable of the troops withdrawal, perhaps in this way the intention to adhere to the timetable of the troops withdrawal is expressed. Here we only can say "and God willing".

At the moment there is only one timetable for the withdrawal of the troops, the one which has been set up and proposed by the Republic of Lithuania, by our official state delegation. It envisages the withdrawal of the troops during the period of several months, even somewhat earlier than the end of the current year, or in any case by the end of this year, namely by calculating the possibilities of the railways and other means of transport.

Deputy Podoprigora expressed his concern about this in his report. We will certainly adhere to this timetable,

however, we do not see the start of its implementation, and it is precisely this matter that the Russian parliament could be concerned with. The principled agreements which had been made earlier are well known, namely the top priority is the withdrawal of Division 107 from Vilnius, with which the official withdrawal of the Russian troops should start. As you know, the start of the withdrawal was agreed upon in February, and February 1992 at that. We are still awaiting the start of the withdrawal. [passage omitted]

CSCE Leaders Sign Conventional Forces Accord

*LD1007084692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0742 GMT 10 Jul 92*

[Text] Helsinki July 10 TASS—Leaders of 29 countries at the CSCE summit on Friday [10 July] signed a final document on the talks regarding the numerical strength of Conventional Forces in Europe. These talks were conducted in Vienna by delegations of NATO countries and the former Eastern bloc.

Based on the principle of sufficiency, the document provides for limiting conventional armed forces deployed on land within the operation area as defined in the conventional forces treaty in Europe. Limits take account of the obligations to preserve a military potential which is necessary to prevent a war and ensure effective defense.

Army Spokesman on CSCE Confidence-Building Measures

*LD1207124492 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 2010 GMT 11 Jul 92*

[Text] An expert with the Russian General Staff, Colonel Boris (?Tretyakov), feels the recent summit in Helsinki laid the groundwork for a change of priorities in the CSCE process. Talking to a reporter for Radio Moscow the colonel said the following:

There will be more negotiations after the summit, and the Helsinki Conference will at last concentrate on trust-building measures. Only new trust can ensure European security. That is Russia's message for further negotiations and further action. This does not mean new negotiations will be starting with a clean slate. The Russian Army expert says a few documents have already been signed to promote trust-building measures. The exchange of information on national armed forces and their further build up has become routine. Foreign observers attend war exercises, defense facilities are visited by foreign inspecting teams, and Army experts of different countries exchange visits, too. An Open Sky agreement allows its signatories' aircraft with no weapons aboard to fly in each other's airspace.

Nonetheless, Col. (?Tretyakov) feels that given the present scale of disarmament efforts, more can be done to promote trust. New and far reaching trust-building

measures are a must for a genuine and reliable disarmament. In other words, the complex of trust-building and arms control measures must outgrow its role of a supporting pillar and turn into the mainstay of the disarmament process. The colonel is sure an ever growing number of Russian and foreign Army men vote for more openness and is ready to accept his point of view and, beyond any doubt, new negotiations in the framework of the Helsinki Conference will reflect the new approach too.

Russian Naval Forces in Baltics Being Withdrawn

*LD1807203392 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1428 GMT 18 Jul 92*

[From the "Military News" section]

[Text] The naval force battleships of Russia are being redислоcated from the Baltic republics to Kronshtadt.

Two submarines from Liepaja (Latvia) arrived this week to Kronshtadt. Now they are assigned to the Leningrad military naval base that is to accept about two dozen submarines and battleships before the end of 1992.

During the Security Council session of July 15-17, the Defense Ministry suggested that the number of armed forces personnel in Russia should not exceed 2.8 million people.

This information was given to PF [POSTFACTUM] in the central organizational department on mobilization under the general staff of Russia.

According to the Ministry of Defense of Russia experts by 1993 the personnel of Russian Army will not exceed 1.5 million people. By this time the Russian Army should have only 60 percent of personnel necessary in its composition and by the end of this year there will be about one million people missing that is not more than 600,000 people will serve in the Army after the personnel reductions.

Russian Parliament Report on CFE Impact on Forces

*924P0154A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Jul 92 pp 1, 2*

[“Report by the Center for National Security and International Relations of the Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation (Abbreviated Account)”: “Conventional Arms Treaty: Consequences for Russia”]

[Text] The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was prepared during the course of negotiations which began in Vienna in March 1989 among delegations of 23 countries (16 NATO countries and seven Warsaw Pact countries) and was signed by the heads of 22 states (the

number of participants decreased because of the unification of Germany) in Paris at a meeting of the heads of states participating in the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] in November 1990.

The mandate of the negotiations and the structure of the treaty were initially set up on the basis of the task of achieving strict quantitative parity in the basic categories of conventional nonnuclear weapons by the two military-political alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

...Now the goal is no longer the achievement of parity between the opposing military-political groupings but a safe and stable balance of conventional weapons with a significant reduction of their numbers in Europe. Additionally, the agreement set the task of eliminating the dangerous imbalances and asymmetry in those categories of conventional arms which determine the possibility of a sudden attack and large-scale offensive operations.

According to the CFE Treaty, five categories of conventional arms are subject to limitation: tanks, BBM's [armored combat vehicles], large-caliber (100 millimeters and more) cannon artillery and salvo fire systems, combat aircraft, and strike helicopters for fire support.

The most important feature of the CFE Treaty is the division of the territory of Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals) into zones with their own sublevels of maximum quantities of arms. The construction of these zones proceeded according to the nested-doll principle, whereby each succeeding expansion includes the preceding part as a constituent element...

Since the conditions for the agreement were formulated in such a way as to make it possible to move arms from the "center to the periphery" without violating the total quantitative restrictions and to prohibit such moves in the reverse direction, this plays a certain stabilizing role in the Central European strategic area. But this approach could also become unproductive in the flanking areas, and therefore the treaty specifies separate quantitative restrictions on the flanking zone. Without being subdivided into northern and southern parts, it includes the territories of Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, Norway, Romania, part of Turkey, and the Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasia, and the Odessa and Leningrad military districts.

As can be seen from Table 1, before the signing of the treaty about 70,000 units of arms or an average of about 100 units each day were transferred beyond the Urals. According to information from the Ministry of Defense, 4,000 tanks were written off for scrap metal, remade into auxiliary vehicles, or sent for export. About 8,000 tanks, mainly modern models, were sent to re-arm units beyond the Urals. Approximately the same number are to be either destroyed or re-equipped for the national economy.

The political disintegration of the USSR, that is, the appearance of a number of new independent states in the zone in which the treaty is in effect, also makes the implementation of the CFE Treaty problematic. There

has arisen a need to transform the quotas formulated for the military districts in the European part of the USSR into quantitative restrictions for states whose borders practically nowhere coincide with the borders of the military districts. This work culminated with the signing in Tashkent of a document on the division of Soviet quotas of the CFE Treaty among the European states of the CIS.

As can be seen from Table 2, the division of the Soviet quota of the CFE Treaty among European states of the CIS does not encroach upon the interests of the security of Russia. In terms of armored equipment and artillery, it receives 1.5-2 times higher ceilings than its closest partner, Ukraine, and in terms of combat aircraft and strike helicopters, this ratio is approximately 3:1 in favor of the Russian Federation. Of the overall quotas for the European part of the USSR, Russia receives 48 percent of the tanks, 57 percent of the BBM's, 48 percent of the artillery systems, 67 percent of the combat aircraft, and 59 percent of the strike helicopters. Taking into account the considerable potential of combat equipment in the Asiatic part of Russia, one can say with confidence that the Tashkent agreement creates no imbalances that endanger Russian interests.

At the same time it should be noted that the question of distribution of the financial and technical participation of the CIS states in the implementation of the CFE Treaty is still open. One can assume that Russia will have to take on all the financial and technical burden of this process, which can hardly be called fair.

Conclusions

1. ...The elimination of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union have led to a situation where our share, that is, Russia's share, will be approximately 15 percent of all the arms in Europe (as compared to the 50-60 percent the Soviet Union had).

3. ...In reality the USSR and its allies had a two- to three-fold superiority over NATO in terms of the main kinds of arms (with the exception of helicopters). Therefore 90 percent of all cuts are for the former USSR and other members of the former Warsaw Pact.

... 5. The CFE Treaty is the only basis for any further steps for the creation of a Europe-wide security system... In essence, today the treaty is the only legal document and the only real instrument making it possible to prevent an arms race among the states of the CIS.

6. The implementation of the Treaty for Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Tashkent agreement concerning the division of the Soviet quota according to the treaty among the former Soviet republics means a repeated reduction of the main grouping of former Soviet troops stationed in Europe (for example, for tanks—eightfold). That is, with respect to ground forces Russia can have several times fewer forces (20-25 divisions) than the USSR. The time period for the implementation of the treaty (40 months) does not leave

us time for a prolonged reduction and a radical reorganization of the armed forces Russia has today.

The time periods and levels established by the treaty preclude leaving the present grouping of Russian forces for a long time on the territory of the Baltic States and a number of other former Soviet republics. The withdrawal and stationing of a large part of these troops on the territory of Russia will not only require colossal means but also could lead to a situation where we violate the international commitments we have made under the CFE Treaty and the Tashkent agreement. Consequently, these troops basically will have to be reformed either in the places where they are currently stationed outside Russia or as they return to Russia.

7. The scale of the armed forces cutbacks envisioned by the treaty requires the immediate adoption of a statewide program for social provisions for military servicemen. Since it would be pointless to retain in the armed forces personnel without arms or even barracks, in the next few months it will be necessary to carry out a reduction of the armed forces and take measures to provide housing, occupational retraining, and labor placement for up to 500,000 officers and warrant officers.

One should also take into account that Russia is not in a position to provide a contingent of recruits for the

current armed forces. In order to avoid a situation in which we would have hundreds of thousands of "superfluous" military servicemen and at the same time have military units that are not staffed, it is necessary to give priority to the most rapid organization of the military service on a contractual basis.

8. Deprived of a quantitative advantage in conventional arms, Russia can successfully carry out further military construction only under the condition that there is a real reorientation to qualitative parameters of military equipment and arms...

9. The geopolitical situation and balance of military forces Russia will encounter as a result of the implementation of the Paris Treaty and the Tashkent agreement require intensification of the efforts of Russian diplomacy in its search for reliable and strong partners and allies. Both in the former Soviet republics (above all Ukraine and Byelarus, which account for about 45 percent of the former Soviet conventional arms quota) and in the United States and other NATO countries.

Thus the ratification of the CFE Treaty and its implementation are fully in keeping with the interests of Russia and will contribute to strengthening its security.

Quantity of USSR Conventional Arms in Europe

Category of Arms	Declared by the Committee of Ministries of Defense of the Warsaw Pact as of 1 Jul 88	Indicated at signing of treaty as of 18 Nov 90	Levels under treaty
Tanks	41,580	20,725	13,300
BBM's	57,800*	29,890	20,000
Artillery systems	42,400	13,938	13,700
Combat aircraft	3,682	6,611	5,150
Strike helicopters**	2,200	1,481	1,500

*The Warsaw Pact declaration indicated 45,000 BBM's.

**The Warsaw Pact declaration gave data on "combat helicopters."

Soviet Quota Section of the CFE Treaty among European CIS States

	Russia	Ukraine	Byelarus	Moldova	Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Flanks	
								Russia	Ukraine
Tanks	6,400	4,080	1,800	210	220	220	220	1,300	280
(including for storage)	1,425	950	275					600	400
BBM's	11,480	5,050	2,600	210	220	220	220	1,380	350
(including for storage)	995	700	425	130	135	135	135	800	
Artillery systems	6,415	4,040	1,615	250	285	285	285	1,680	—
(including for storage)	1,310	800	240						
Combat Aircraft	3,450	1,090	260	50	100	100	100	—	—
Strike helicopters	890	330	80	50	50	50	50	—	—
Naval aircraft	300	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Russian Spokesman Lauds U.S. Tactical Arms Withdrawal

LD0707121892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1206 GMT 7 Jul 92

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Skripnikov and Sergey Staroselskiy]

[Text] Moscow July 7 TASS—The United States has completely withdrawn its tactical nuclear weapons from foreign states for subsequent elimination, according to reports. "We assess it as good news", spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry said at a briefing on Tuesday [7 July].

Sergey Yastrzhembskiy added that Russia is implementing the decree of its president on the withdrawal and elimination of tactical nuclear arms. The weapons were transferred from Byelarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Russia for elimination. A number of agreements on eliminating the weapons has been signed with the United States and new joint measures are being negotiated, he added.

Mutual Russian and U.S. efforts in the sphere of tactical nuclear arms considerable lower the nuclear danger, the spokesman stressed, adding Russia is ready to move forward in the field.

U.S. Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons Welcomed

PM0907125592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Jul 92 p 3

[M. Aleksandrov article: "When Words Are Followed By Actions"]

[Text] As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported, the United States has completed the process of withdrawing tactical nuclear arms from other countries' territory. This is an extraordinary event. It attests that the international climate is continuing to improve and the danger of nuclear war is receding more and more.

It should be recalled that the decision to eliminate its entire world arsenal of short-range nuclear weapons, in other words U.S. theater nuclear weapons, came last September. It was made public in President G. Bush's televised address to the nation in which he set out other wide-ranging initiatives by Washington in the sphere of disarmament and of reducing military confrontation. At first commentators in both Moscow and the capitals of other countries took a rather cautious view of this. Politicians from various countries have made all too many fine speeches over the last few years and they have made all too many promises of various kinds. But by no means all of these have been implemented.

Yet we can now see that words are being followed by actions. The world is being rid of another category of nuclear arms—this time tactical arms. The initiative was

taken by the former Soviet Union, which removed from central Europe in 1989 500 combat tactical weapons (166 aircraft bombs, 50 artillery shells, and 284 missiles) and subsequently another 200 tactical missile launchers (the "Tochka" and "Luna" complexes), more than 3,000 nuclear artillery pieces (artillery pieces of 152 mm and over capable of firing nuclear shells), and a corresponding quantity of nuclear munitions. This year the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons not only from central Europe but also from Ukraine and Byelarus was completed.

Now the United States has traveled its part of the way too. Implementing the initiative announced by G. Bush last September, it has completed the withdrawal from Europe for subsequent destruction of all the remaining 1,000 nuclear artillery shells and 700 "Lance" short-range missile warheads, as well as 200 B-57 depth charges and 500 sea-launched missiles. A measure which the U.S. President himself described as historic.

Well, one must agree with him. Not only because another major step has been taken toward nuclear disarmament. But above all perhaps because it is becoming obvious to everyone that words are being followed by actions.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Bush Rejection of Nuclear Test Proposal Noted

Letter by Administration Official Cited

PM2007110192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Jul 92 First Edition p 7

[ITAR-TASS report under the "Disarmament" general heading: "Nuclear Explosions Give Confidence to Washington"]

[Text] U.S. President George Bush has rejected a proposal to limit significantly the number of U.S. underground nuclear tests and adopted a decision to adhere to current practice regarding such tests.

THE WASHINGTON POST reported this, citing the text of a letter it received from high-ranking representatives of the administration explaining Bush's decision, which was submitted to Congress 10 July.

"The administration continues to believe that the nuclear test program, which is insignificant in terms of scale, is necessary to preserve confidence in our greatly reduced nuclear deterrence forces," the letter states.

The letter describes the U.S. President's decision as a shift in U.S. policy, as nuclear tests will now only be conducted to verify the reliability and safety of existing nuclear weapons, and not for the creation of new ones. The newspaper points out, however, that back in January U.S. officials declared that there are no plans to create new nuclear weapons. "Under the circumstances which can be foreseen at present," the letter says, "we do not anticipate conducting more than six tests a year over the

next five years or more than three tests of a capacity greater than 35 kilotonnes."

U.S. 'Failed' To Meet Challenge

*LD1807183792 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1710 GMT 17 Jul 92*

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Text] The White House is reported to have dismissed the idea of reducing the number of nuclear testings which will be kept up at a level of six blasts a year. Comment is by Vladislav Kozyakov and this is what he writes:

This follows Mr. Bush's decision now published in a letter to the Senate by the Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, the Energy Secretary James Watkins, and the Presidential aide Brent Scowcroft. To stave off criticism, they have given reassurances that the nuclear explosions will be carried out only to test the safety and reliability of nuclear warheads, but not to develop new weapons. They also held out promises of cutting the number of U.S. nuclear tests in the future.

Arguments of this kind can hardly be a convincing response to widespread demands for an immediate nuclear test ban. Mr. Bush's decision happens to coincide with a call on the American president by leaders of the antinuclear campaign, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear Wars, to abandon further tests.

The leaders of the movement uniting physicians from 80 countries do not believe that further tests now that the cold war is over makes any sense. They say the safety of the existing nuclear stockpiles can be ensured without recourse to nuclear explosions—a view that is shared by experts in other countries.

The administration's decision to go ahead with tests as before appears to be out of line even with its proclaimed policy of nuclear cutbacks, together with Russia, and effective international measures for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Each new explosion in the Nevada desert can evoke nothing but doubts in Washington's commitment to those goals.

There was a unique opportunity for the suspension of nuclear testings as an initial step before a comprehensive ban now that both Russia and France want to maintain a test moratorium until the end of this year.

Canada and Norway have both said they are supportive of moves by Moscow and Paris. Elsewhere calls can be heard to follow the two countries' suit.

The House of Representatives in a change of heart in June passed a bill calling for a 12-month suspension of nuclear tests, and more than half in the Senate put forward a similar bill to be debated soon. Significantly the Democratic candidate for presidency, Bill Clinton, is in favor of a comprehensive test ban, while former President Jimmy Carter in a speech to the Democrats'

national convention regretted to say that his country remained the only stumbling block on the way to such a ban.

The issue of nuclear explosions is becoming a serious trial test for the White House, a challenge which it has so far failed to meet.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Russia Assumes USSR Treaty Obligations on CBW

Supreme Soviet Resolution

*LD0807132692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1244 GMT 8 Jul 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunaisky]

[Text] Moscow July 8 TASS—Russian parliament on Wednesday [8 July] adopted a resolution "On Russia's international obligations on chemical and biological weapons" [CBW]. The resolution stipulates that Russia is USSR's legal successor in its obligations on the convention on prohibition of development, production and accumulation of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons, on bilateral agreements with the U.S.A. and in its adherence to achieving a global convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Russian Government was obliged to work out diverse programmes on the destruction of chemical weapons and present them to parliament by September 15.

Funds Allocated for Elimination

*OW0807144592 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1311 GMT 8 Jul 92*

[From "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia's parliament has adopted a resolution on ensuring the fulfilment of the country's international commitments in the area of chemical and biological weapons.

The document reaffirms Russia's adherence to the commitments made under the convention on banning the development, production and accumulation of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and on scrapping them. It also reaffirms devotion to the Soviet-American agreements on control over chemical arms and their scrapping, as well as to the intention to sign a global convention on banning chemical weapons.

The Russian President is recommended to submit to the parliament draft bills on banning the development, production and accumulation of bacteriological (biological)

and toxic weapons, and on making government officials accountable for their failure to comply with these commitments.

The parliament found it expedient to make special allocations, also in hard currency, to ensure the fulfillment of Russia's commitments in connection with chemical and biological weapons.

Russia's government is instructed to submit to the parliament before September 15 composite programs for scrapping chemical arms.

Vitaliy Vitebskiy, deputy chairman of the committee on industry and power-engineering, has said that it was decided to allocate in the current year 8 billion rubles for the scrapping of chemical and biological weapons. According to him, this will make it possible to start negotiations with Italy and Germany on the possibility of granting Russia aid in this connection. American aid has already been promised.

Practical, Political Problems in CW Elimination

Committee Chairman Views Cost

OW0807151092 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1311 GMT 8 Jul 92

[From "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia proclaimed its intention to sign a global convention on banning chemical arms and pledged to scrap their stockpiles. However the implementation of these commitments is in a critical state, said Dr. A. Kuntsevich, chairman of the committee on conventional problems connected with chemical and biological weapons, in his report.

He pointed to the lack of a concrete program or schedule for the scrapping of chemical arsenals and to the absence of a special industrial base needed for this purpose. "The experimental facility built for this purpose in Chapayevsk is besieged by the public. Local government bodies refuse to authorize the construction of facilities for the scrapping of chemical arms on their soil", he said.

Besides, A. Kuntsevich mentioned difficulties connected with the financing of specialized research centers and "former facilities for the production of chemical arms where work is suspended". This leads to a loss of "unique specialists" experienced in handling toxic substances.

Under the circumstances the committee led by A. Kuntsevich suggests in accordance with the Russian President's decree of June 12 that a network of plants for scrapping chemical arms should be created step by step.

The committee finds it necessary to resume, as the first step, "limited work at a plant built for the production of chemical arms in order to process (scrap) chemical arsenals with subsequent reconstruction aimed at

increasing its capacity". According to committee members, this is the most economical way making it possible for Russia to draw nearer the time when it will begin to fulfil its international commitments.

The committee also believes that at the same time it's necessary to ensure "readiness for scrapping" the old toxic substances kept in storage reservoirs in Udmurtia and in Saratov Region. Besides, it's necessary to design a "mobile complex" for scrapping chemical arms and set up a national control center, laboratories and "other organizations for accomplishing conventional tasks".

The committee also calls for taking measures aimed at ensuring social security for those who work at the facilities for scrapping chemical arms, and at improving the living standards of people who reside in the vicinity of such plants.

In his report Dr. A. Kuntsevich estimates that the annual expenses connected with the efforts to scrap chemical weapons [CW] might amount to 5 or 10 billion rubles. It's imperative to allocate no less than 1.8 billion rubles for these needs in the current year. As for the overall expenditure connected with the scrapping of chemical weapons, it will make up no less than 100 billion rubles that can be partially compensated by means of converting various chemical arms components into products for civilian needs".

Major Views CW Convention Implementation

PM1207145592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Major M. Zheglov: "Russia Will Definitely Destroy Its Chemical Weapons. But Not Just Yet"]

[Text] Work on the draft Convention on the Total Prohibition and Elimination of Chemical Weapons [CW] has ended at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. According to preliminary assessments, it will be signed by the European countries, the United States, Canada, Japan, and many African, Asian, and Latin American states no later than the start of next year. The signatories will undoubtedly include the Russian Federation, the possessor of the largest stocks of this type of weapon of mass destruction today. Furthermore, Russia, as legal successor to the former Union, must begin the destruction process no later than 31 December 1992. That is enshrined in the Soviet-U.S. agreement signed two years ago, but it will not begin by then.

According to Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the Russian President's Committee on the Conventional [konventsionalnyy] Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, this is because before this year we had no organ with responsibility at state level for preparing for the destruction of chemical weapons. The Defense Ministry, the Chemical Industry Ministry, and a number of others prepared a full-scale state program for their elimination. The program was sent to the Union Supreme

Soviet and a report was sent to the USSR president. For a whole series of objective and subjective reasons the program was not approved and the resources were consequently not allocated. So there is no question of its implementation today.

After the USSR ceased to exist the question of the legal responsibility for chemical weapons arose. On 19 February 1992 the Russian president issued a decree to resolve this problem by setting up the Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Its formation, incidentally, in practice marked the completion of the creation of the system of presidential control of all types of weapons of mass destruction. The new organ immediately began to elaborate a new concept for the destruction of chemical weapons.

The concept's fundamental difference is that Russia cannot and will not embark immediately on a large-scale program for the elimination of chemical weapons. We will move toward that in stages, as Anatoliy Kuntsevich stressed, by creating a structure of installations which would not be such a burden to the Russian economy. Specialists believe that some of the resources thus expended could be recouped.

Efforts, of course, will be concentrated on ensuring that the reaction products [reaktsionnyye massy] produced as a result of neutralizing the toxic substances involved will not be incinerated but will be used to resolve a number of technical tasks linked to the creation of solutions with a whole series of complex characteristics—fireproofing, antiseptic, and anticorrosion characteristics. There are other, larger projects for the recycling of, for example, lewisite which will help to provide our microelectronics industry with raw materials for at least 15 years.

During the first stage the plan is to convert several chemical-weapons production enterprises to chemical weapons destruction. On the one hand, these installations are ready right now and their upkeep will not require additional spending. On the other hand, a high degree of safety is guaranteed there, everything has been checked out in real-life conditions. At the same time a mobile complex will operate which, when necessary, will make it possible to increase the amount of chemical weapons being destroyed. Finally, as part of the first stage a center is being created to ensure monitoring, including at international level, of the process of the elimination of toxic substances.

Incidentally, we will not only be monitored but given certain assistance within the framework of cooperation. It is planned, for example, that U.S. specialists will take part in devising the best techniques for the destruction of chemical weapons. They will support those techniques with more productive and reliable systems, more hermetically sealed and protected equipment, and automation and control systems.

If everything goes off without a hitch, that is, if the plan for the destruction of chemical weapons is adopted by all the interested sides and, most important, is financed, the

first tonnes of chemical toxins should be destroyed by the end of 1993 or early 1994. Accordingly the timetable for the final elimination has been put back some years. However, this should not be seen as a major tragedy. People abroad understand perfectly well all the complexities of the present economic situation in Russia. They can see that our specialists are working on real preparation for the destruction of this type of weapon of mass destruction.

It is highly likely that the problems involved in the implementation of the program for the elimination of 40,000 tonnes of chemical toxins will occur not so much abroad or in the economic sphere as in people's minds. People still remember the events at the installation in Chapayevsk, where the local authorities and the public stopped it from functioning. This factor is taken into account in the elaboration of the new program for the destruction of chemical weapons.

Its implementation is dependent on the commitment of the local authorities and the population. This commitment takes the following form: In zones where fixed or mobile chemical weapons destruction complexes are to operate, citizens and property must be given guarantees of insurance, effective medical monitoring and support must be provided, and systems and centers must be set up to keep the population informed. Improvements to the social infrastructure of these regions are also envisaged. In this regard it is planned that investments in the interests of the local organs of power will amount to 30 percent of the total investment in the program. The interests of those participating in the elimination of the chemical toxins have not been forgotten either. Plans for them include quite high wages, the solution of the housing problem, etc.

These measures, combined with safety guarantees and an extensive information campaign, should help to alleviate the population's psychological stress, and the implementation of the program will begin on time, especially since the Americans have evacuated their own chemical weapons right across Europe and the Atlantic without incident and are destroying them safely.

Dangerous Situation at Kaliningrad CW Dump

*PM1607141392 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 16 Jul 92 p 2*

[Article by I. Rudnikov: "Where Are the Wehrmacht's Chemical Munitions?"]

[Text] Some 17 underground storage facilities "inherited" from the German Army in 1945 are located on the territory of the Baltic Fleet arsenal. There are 100-150 carloads of different munitions there. Their condition is frightening. The question of clearing the storage facilities and moving the captured munitions further away from the city is not on the agenda. The conclusions reached by all the special commissions over the past 40-odd years

have been unambiguous: It is better not to touch the storage facilities at all because they could "blow up" at any time.

The consequences of such an explosion are hard to calculate. The Baltic Fleet Headquarters is not ruling out the possibility that a large proportion of the Wehrmacht's chemical weapons—which are still being sought for some reason on the floor of the Baltic—are located there.

This version is backed up by the following fact. In the spring of 1945, when the East Prussia Operation was under way and the attacking Soviet forces were not giving the Germans time to evacuate, an order was sent from Berlin to destroy all weapons dumps. All storage facilities on the territory of this German arsenal—apart from the 17 underground—were blown up. There Hitlerites only blew up the above-ground buildings and the entrances to them. On the basis of the theory that chemical weapons were present, this would have been logical.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Russian Military Officials, Ukraine's Bizhan Cited

OW0607210492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1833 GMT 6 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Behind the scenes of the Moscow CIS summit senior Russian military experts have been saying they are pessimistic about the possibility of coordinated control of strategic nuclear arms. They say that Ukraine's position on that issue leaves no hope that the nuclear forces deployed on its territory can be jointly controlled. The experts say that this is nothing but Ukraine's intention to remain a nuclear power despite its pronounced commitment to its intention to go nuclear-free.

Experts from the General Staff of the Russian armed forces recall that the CIS Defence Ministers' conference was offered three options: the withdrawal of all nuclear warheads from Ukraine and their subsequent elimination; the replacement of the warheads with simulators; the simple dismantling of the warheads from the delivery vehicles and their keeping at Ukrainian bases. All the three proposals were rejected. Russian experts have blamed that on the "lack of goodwill". President Leonid Kravchuk said on Monday [6 July] that the principle of Ukraine's administrative control of strategic nuclear arms on its territory remained unchanged.

The Russian military experts say this places Russia in a very difficult position, for it is the depository country of the nuclear arms non-proliferation treaty. Any agreements that implement that treaty partially put Russia itself in the position of its abuser. The experts have

described as a stumbling block President Yeltsin's April decree N 209, which in effect placed strategic offensive arms in Ukraine under his control. The Russian experts say this is a legal trap.

[Moscow INTERFAX in English, during the same 1833 GMT cast, transmits the following: "Ukraine insists on keeping nuclear warheads in assembly with the delivery vehicles deployed on its territory, largely because it has no confidence in Marshal Shaposhnikov's statements", the Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Ivan Bizhan has told INTERFAX. "We have been offered to replace those warheads with non-nuclear equivalents", Bizhan said. "However it is quite clear that there are not enough equivalents for all missiles. [no end quotation mark as received] Without them the delivery vehicles may become dangerous.

[Ivan Bizhan explained his doubts by the fact that six months ago in Alma-Ata the Council of the Heads of State and government asked the CIS Commander-in-Chief Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov to provide the Ukrainian president with the technical means to block the use of nuclear arms. "Shaposhnikov said he would do that, but has failed to do anything to this date", Bizhan said. Moreover, he claims that this is impossible. For that reason we want a comprehensive and consistent settlement of the problem, the more so since this does not disagree with the START-2 treaty.

[Asked about what made Ukraine change its position after it had already announced it was going to remove all nuclear arms from its territory by 1994, Ivan Bizhan said: "Our experts have studied the technical aspects of the problem and found that it cannot be done sooner than seven years".

[About another proposal from the CIS allied command for cancelling the targeting of the missiles Ivan Bizhan said it was none of Ukraine's problem, but if that could be done, Ukraine would have nothing against.]

Ukrainian Official on 'Administrative Control' of Missiles

LD0607120592 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1110 GMT 6 Jul 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, July 6 TASS—Ukraine will not join the CIS air-defence system as it can provide anti-aircraft protection by its own forces. However, the Republican Defence Ministry worked out a draft agreement on air-defence interaction with neighbouring states, including Russia, Ukrainian First Deputy Defence Minister Ivan Bizhan told TASS on Monday [6 July].

Ukraine will not participate in the activities of the CIS Armed Forces Main Command either as there are no units subordinated to the command which are deployed in Ukraine, excluding the strategic forces. However, "we should participate at least in the near future in the work

of the CIS Council of Defence Ministers although our minister is not officially a member of the body", Bizhan stressed.

Ukrainian position on strategic forces deployed on its territory remains unchanged, according to the deputy minister. "We shall insist on (possessing) administrative control of strategic forces as only that can guarantee the interests of national security", he said.

Bizhan stressed that CIS proposals to delete flight maps from onboard computers of strategic missiles, or to replace nuclear warheads by dummy ones will not solve the problems of safe storage of nuclear charges and will not guarantee that the nuclear charges will not be used against Ukraine. "We leave operational control over the strategic forces to the CIS main command according to intergovernmental agreements", he said. The administrative control is necessary to determine the legal status of the military from the strategic forces deployed in Ukraine, he added.

Ukrainian President on Nuclear Arms Elimination

To Liquidate Weapons 'With Pleasure'

AU0707194092 Paris AFP in English
1829 GMT 7 Jul 92

[Text] Brussels, July 7 (AFP)—Ukraine intends to destroy all of its nuclear arsenal as quickly as possible, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said here Tuesday [7 July].

Speaking briefly to journalists during his visit to Brussels, Kravchuk said: "If we have the chance to liquidate our nuclear arms before the allotted time, we will do it with pleasure.

"Let me repeat, that we shall not be moving these arms elsewhere, but destroying them," he added.

Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes said he had spoken with the Ukrainian president about the importance of conforming with the START treaty agreed to by the United States and former Soviet Union on reducing strategic nuclear arms.

Kravchuk's comments come in the wake of criticism that Ukraine has shown some ambiguity in presenting itself as a nuclear power while agreeing to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

At a CIS summit in Moscow on Monday, Ukraine annoyed other members of the Community [as received] of Independent States by insisting on "administrative" control over strategic forces rather than handing them over to central control.

On-Site Weapons Destruction Urged

PM1007131592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Jul 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Maksim Gan: "Ukraine Does Not Intend To Delay Elimination of Nuclear Weapons"]

[Excerpt] Ukraine's position on the question of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons to Russian territory remains unchanged, but nuclear warheads must, wherever possible, be destroyed on the spot, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, who is on a working visit to Belgium, told journalists.

According to the president, Ukraine is "pleased" to eliminate its nuclear weapons earlier than planned and the Ukrainian parliament will soon ratify the treaty on reducing strategic arms with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Byelarus. In Brussels Kravchuk also intends to discuss with NATO representatives the possibility of developing relations, since NATO "now plays a political rather than a military role." [passage omitted]

Byelarusian Defense Minister on Arms Withdrawal Schedule

Command of Strategic Forces Viewed

OW0707164492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1623 GMT 7 Jul 92

[Prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from "Presidential Bulletin"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpts] The Speaker of the Byelarusian Parliament Stanislav Shushkevich held a press conference in Minsk today. Discussing his impressions on the CIS Summit in Moscow, he said that the leaders demonstrated mutual understanding in the discussion over the distribution of all former Soviet property abroad, which was the most pleasant surprise for him. The Byelarusian delegation did not have to prove the untenability of Russian experts' proposals, for the Russian delegation admitted it itself. As a result, a document acceptable for all CIS members was signed. [passage omitted]

The Byelarusian Defense Minister, Colonel-General Pavel Kozlovskiy [as received], said at the press conference that the CIS strategic forces within Byelarusian borders can not belong to anyone. Stanislav Shushkevich confirmed Byelarus' desire to go nuclear-free and said: "Our republic is an actual participant of the Treaty on Collective Security, though we did not sign it. Our laws prohibit it, but we still have nuclear missiles".

The Byelarusian leader said the summit touched on the issue of the CIS strategic forces' transfer into Russia's jurisdiction and determination of their status and deadlines for their withdrawal. Though strategic nuclear missiles installations were planned earlier to be withdrawn from the republic in seven years, the republic

would like to complete it before the date, Stanislav Shushkevich said. [passage omitted]

Caution on Non-Nuclear Status Advised

*LD0807181792 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1710 GMT 8 Jul 92*

[From the "Military News" section]

[Text] The Byelarus deputy defence minister: Byelarus should not be in a hurry to proclaim its non-nuclear status and withdraw strategic nuclear weapons as the developments in the CIS are unpredictable possession of nuclear weapons will be instrumental in Byelarus achieving the situation when during the first period of its independence taking root it will be reckoned with in the world, the deputy defence minister, Colonel-General Petr Chaus also said in an interview to the Byelarusian newspaper ZVYAZDA of July 7. According to Chaus, there has never been a situation when a state should renounce nuclear weapons, on the contrary, everybody is seeking to have them. Speaking on Byelarus' neutrality, Petr Chaus said, in particular, that Austria, Sweden and a number of other neutral states, following the disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty, seek to give up pure neutrality and there is a lot of sense in this kind of policy, he said.

'Determined To Become Nuclear-Free'

*LD1407130192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1033 GMT 14 Jul 92*

[By BELTA correspondent Leonid Tratsevskiy]

[Text] Minsk, 14 Jul (TASS)—The republic does not need subunits of strategic troops, the most powerful fleet of tanks in Europe, or any other weapons systems deployed on the territory of the republic in accordance with the military doctrine of the former USSR. This is what Colonel-General Petr Chaus, deputy defense minister of Byelarus, declared in an interview to the republican newspaper ZVYAZDA. He underscored, however, that the republican leadership understands Russia is not yet able to redeploy these troops on its own territory.

Earlier Byelarus declared it is determined to become a neutral, nuclear-free state and has not signed the CIS states treaty on collective security because, as an independent state, it does not wish to enter into any military unions or alliances. General Chaus noted that Byelarus considered its national armed forces as an attribute of its statehood and as an integral part of a single European system of security.

No 'Hurry' To Withdraw Nuclear Arms

*PM2007094192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jul 92 p 3*

[Colonel Valeriy Kovalev report: "Petr Chaus: 'I Believe That We Must Not Be Hasty in Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons From Republic's Territory'"]

[Text] On 15 July the Ostankino television company reported that, according to Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Petr Chaus, the Republic of Byelarus is declaring its nuclear-free status.

On the same day, your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent spoke to Colonel General Chaus over the telephone and it unexpectedly came to light that the deputy defense minister...had nothing to do with the statement that was made on the television. His true position on this question is reflected in an interview with the republican newspaper ZVYAZDA. In this interview Chaus specifically confirmed that the republic will strive to become a neutral and nuclear-free state and that it does not intend to join any military blocs or alliances. At the same time he stated that he is not sure that Byelarus can acquire nuclear-free status within seven years, as the press frequently maintains. It is hard to say exactly how much time is in actually needed for the withdrawal of all nuclear components from its territory. "To my mind," the general said, "in the interests of the republic, we must not be hasty in the withdrawal of strategic nuclear missiles. The presence of such a powerful weapon in our country will at first help Byelarus to establish itself. The whole world treats us as a nuclear power.... Another reason why we must not be in a hurry to withdraw the strategic nuclear weapons is that the development of events in the CIS in the present situation is simply unpredictable."

At the same time, according to Chaus, Byelarus will always participate with other countries in the negotiating process on nuclear disarmament and will conscientiously fulfill the obligations placed upon it.

Kazakh Aides Reassure U.S. on Nuclear Arms Control, Elimination

*LD1607141192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1254 GMT 16 Jul 92*

[By KAZTAG correspondent Ivan Zakharchenko for TASS]

[Text] Alma Ata July 16 TASS—Strategic nuclear missiles, still deployed in Kazakhstan, are under reliable control of its Defense Ministry. The timetable for their elimination, envisaged by appropriate agreements, will be strictly observed. This statement was made on Thursday [16 July] by State Advisor Tulegen Zhukeyev and Defense Minister of Kazakhstan Colonel General Sagadat Nurmagambetov at a meeting with a visiting delegation of the U.S. Defense Department.

Speaking about the problems of establishment of Kazakhstan's Armed Forces, Nurmagambetov emphasised that they will consist of small but highly mobile forces. The defense minister noted the significance of the treaty with Russia which provides for Russian assistance in solving that problem.

The delegation also met Kazakh Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko.

CIS, Ukrainian Officials on Nuclear Arms

*OW1707083392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0754 GMT 17 Jul 92*

[From the "Problems and Opinions" feature: "The Nature of the Disagreements Between Ukraine and the Chief Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces on Strategic Nuclear Armaments"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Interviews given to our correspondent Marina Chernukha by Ukrainian First Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Bizhan and the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov.

Correspondent [Corr.]: As far as I can see, the ultimate reason for Marshal Shaposhnikov's objections is that the missiles stationed on your territory are not his responsibility since they are going to be formally controlled by Ukraine. Could you explain Ukraine's position on this issue?

BIZHAN: Although Ukraine is not a nuclear state, it has found itself in a position where it has nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. So you can't expect Ukraine to take no interest at all in what will be happening to these weapons. It certainly matters to us whether missiles will be launched from our territory. We firmly intend to keep to the terms of START 2, which calls for the consistent reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. So we want not only the nuclear warheads but also the booster rockets to be removed from our territory.

Corr.: Some time ago Ukraine insisted on becoming a nuclear-free state in 1994. What made you decide afterwards that it needed as long as seven years to attain this status?

BIZHAN: You see, when the experts had done all the calculations it became clear that it was impossible to remove all strategic nuclear forces from Ukraine by 1994. So the reason for our decision was purely technical. Nor does this contradict START 2.

Corr.: Why can't you accept detargeting and the removal of the nuclear warheads if they are to be replaced with nonnuclear equivalents?

BIZHAN: Because the problem should be solved consistently: If you remove the warheads you should dismantle the boosters immediately after that. Of course, it would be the easiest thing for Shaposhnikov to do to remove all the warheads and take them out of Ukraine. Whereas Ukraine will be left with those boosters which are quite dangerous if the warheads are removed.

Corr.: Are you not convinced that Marshal Shaposhnikov will keep his promise to dismantle the boosters after replacing the nuclear warheads with nonnuclear equivalents?

BIZHAN: I'm not entirely convinced—let's put it like this. Some time ago the Council of Heads of State

instructed Shaposhnikov to provide the Ukrainian President with technical means to prevent nuclear weapons stationed on our territory from being used. He promised he'd get everything done in a month. It's been six months now, and nothing has been done. More than that, he's now saying this is unfeasible anyway.

Corr.: Would you consent to the detargeting of the missiles?

BIZHAN: That's up to Maksimov and Shaposhnikov. If they think that's the most important thing to do, let them do it. We won't object.

We thought we ought to ask Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov to comment on this interview.

SHAPOSHNIKOV: It is true that it was suggested in Alma-Ata some time ago that the presidents of CIS states be provided with means to prevent nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of their states from being used. I said during the discussion that we would think about it. First of all, we established a kind of hot lines among all presidents. Each president can now make use of such a line to voice his disagreement with the rest on any military matter. We think this is quite enough. What Ukraine demands effectively means its joining the system of technical control of nuclear weapons, in which case the world would regard it as a nuclear state. So Ukraine should first of all decide whether it wants to be a nuclear or nonnuclear power.

I would actually like another hot line to be established, one between President Leonid Kravchuk and the commander of the strategic forces in Ukraine, so that the latter could also take part in making decisions on strategic armaments. As for the complaints of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, I've never made any such promises. We did talk about this but all I promised was to study the problem and report on the results.

Corr.: What do the Ukrainians think of your proposals?

SHAPOSHNIKOV: We informed the Ukrainian President and Defense Minister about them. They accept the proposals on the whole but insist on a stronger prevention mechanism. At the moment we're having discussions with them.

As for Ivan Bizhan's claim that we won't have enough nonnuclear equivalents to replace the nuclear warheads on the same boosters, it's groundless because we have a concrete program which we intend to carry out with the participation of Ukraine and under its control. First of all, we would detarget part of the missiles, remove the warheads from them, take them out of Ukraine and replace them with nonnuclear equivalents.

Then, with the participation of Ukraine and Russia, we would remove the boosters from Ukrainian territory. After that we would do the same with another part of the missiles, and so on. In this way we could solve the

problem completely by the end of 1993 and make Ukraine an entirely nuclear-free state, which is what it wants.

Corr.: Bizhan says this is technically unfeasible.

SHAPOSHNIKOV: No, all of this is feasible. I actually have the impression that the strategic armaments issue became a trump card for the Ukrainian nationalists when confrontation began between Russia and Ukraine over the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet.

Corr.: Is it true that boosters will be dangerous after the nuclear warheads are removed and not replaced with nonnuclear equivalents?

SHAPOSHNIKOV: To some extent it is. There can, for example, be fuel leakages, although there can be no explosions. But boosters are, of course, more dangerous with nuclear warheads than with nonnuclear equivalents.

Corr.: Ukraine has apparently no objection to the detargeting of the missiles. Does that solve most of the problems?

SHAPOSHNIKOV: No. Some independent experts have estimated that a state like Ukraine is able to develop its own targeting system within a few years. So we'll insist on detargeting.

FRANCE

Reasons for Rejecting American GPALS Project

92ES0970B Paris *LIBERATION* in French 29 Jun 92 p 9

[Article by Pascal Boniface: "Illusion of an Antimissile Defense"]

[Text] Under the double consequence of nuclear and ballistic proliferation and of the American GPALS (Global Protection Against Limited Strike) project, anti-missile defenses should be a major trump of this strategic end-of-the-century debate.

The GPALS project is a revised and scaled-down version of the SDI program launched by Reagan, whose ambition was to prevent any Soviet ballistic missile from penetrating American territory. Its current objective is to be capable of stopping from 100 to 200 ballistic missiles thanks to a warning and intercepting missile system based on both space and land. In addition to its less ambitious goals, the GPALS' advantage over the SDI is that it does not arouse the opposition of either Congress or Moscow. Boris Yeltsin even hopes to see Russia associated with the United States on that project. Thus, it is almost certain that Washington will pursue it. France and Europe must therefore confront two issues: Is industrial cooperation a must? What position should be taken on a strategic level?

The affair is tempting for industrialists in defense facing a trend toward heavily reduced military expenses. But they should not get their hopes too high: The share of the pie that they will receive will look more like crumbs. Non-U.S. industries only represented one percent of the contracts concluded for the SDI; furthermore, most of them went to Israel for the development of the Arrow missile. Therefore, one can try one's luck. But the price to pay should not be a government-level agreement on the GPALS, for the project does not conform to the strategic interests of France.

First of all, let us note that at a time when each party is expressing satisfaction over the progress of land and sea disarmament, that system is going to rekindle the space arms race. The 1967 multilateral treaty on the peaceful use of space and the 1972 Soviet-American ABM treaty—the latter having resisted the ups and downs of the new cold war—risk flying into pieces. Each party can agree that placing observation systems in space is of interest. To deploy intercepting missiles there is another matter.

The ulterior motives of the United States are clear, namely, getting rid of the nuclear threat. Since the Americans lost their nuclear monopoly, the nuclear arena has become for them a factor of risk as much as of power. One might even think that the equalizing-of-inequalities nature represented by nuclear power is unbearable to a superpower, because it is an obstacle to its influence. The GPALS conforms to the new American perception of the nuclear threat coming from the South.

It reverts to inventing again the old debate over the sword and the shield. The frequently announced victory of the latter over the former has never occurred for the very simple reason that, if the shield can be perfected, so can the sword benefit from the same technological advances.

From the French viewpoint, the putting into place of a SAMPT (middle range surface-to-air land weapons) defensive system is not intrinsically reprehensible. It is roughly equivalent to expanding the DCA [Air Constructions Administration]: Protection against conventional missiles is no more absurd than protection against aircraft. To participate in the GPALS, which targets a nuclear threat (but which in France is sometimes presented as an alternative to the SAMPT system), has a different type of appeal. The only way we can strategically oppose a nuclear threat is not with an illusory defensive system, beyond our financial means, but with a response capability. Pure reason and simple logic assume that if one is capable of ensuring deterrence from the weak to the strong, deterrence from the strong to the weak should be easier still.

Rejecting the GPALS is no more dictated by the fear that the system may thwart the credibility of the French retaliatory force than rejecting the SDI was. That force is already greater in size than the projected interception capability of the GPALS. If the project is once again challenging deterrence, it is not so much on a material level as on a psychological one, as the challenge is not being presented for what it is—a protection and strategic stabilization—but for what the Americans perceive it to be—a threat.

Defense Minister Views Military Capability

LD1607001392 Paris *France-Inter Radio Network* in French 1720 GMT 15 Jul 92

[Studio interview with Defense Minister Pierre Joxe by unidentified listeners with phone-in questions including correspondent Michel Polaco—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Question] Do you not think that one takes serious risks by disarming immediately? [passage omitted]

In the meantime, events in the East, in Yugoslavia, and Azerbaijan show us that the situation has not been stabilized there at all and that we are not even certain of the very democratic options which are to be taken in Russia or Ukraine, for example?

[Joxe] First, thank you for inviting me to this very intelligent France Inter program which, I hope, will enable me to answer many questions from citizens, civilians, and the military or reservists. [passage omitted]

I must tell you first that we are not disarming. We are limiting, stabilizing the defense budget in France, the same in fact as is being done in other Western democracies, in Britain, Germany, and the United States. Everywhere there is, in general, a decrease. In France we are stabilizing the cost of the budget. Why? Because the threat has changed but there remains a threat; the threat of a major confrontation between the two Eastern and Western blocs; that of a nuclear, world war has receded, but the imbalances in Europe as you have hinted, also the risks of proliferation in countries which would like to acquire nuclear and chemical weapons as well as long-range missiles, imposes on us the need to maintain our defense capabilities. In fact, that is why we keep our nuclear deterrent and maintain military capabilities at a high level. In fact, France's military capabilities are high-level ones. The same with the land forces, Air Force, and Navy. We keep conscription, the same as most of the Western democracies, while having cut the service down to 10 months. Therefore, we are careful to face up to current threats and to be able to react in case the threat increases. To answer your precise question: Yes, the nuclear program was conceived at a moment when one feared a big frontal attack from the East, in Central Europe. The need for tanks seems lesser now. We are not certain of Russia's democratic future, so we maintain a certain, not suspicion because we trust the Russian people, but caution because Russia as well as Ukraine and Kazakhstan currently possess a considerable nuclear arsenal. Is this a threat comparable to the one when there was a threatening political regime? No, but there is a risk because there are several million nuclear warheads which still exist within the former Soviet Union. That is why we remain vigilant while stabilizing the defense expenditure and reorganizing our Armed Forces in order to make them more mobile.

[Question] Does it worry you that there are nuclear weapons in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelarus or that, for example, Ukraine does not accept taking orders from Russia?

[Joxe] As to the fact that Ukraine does not, as you put it, accept to take orders from Russia, Ukraine is an independent country, a country like France with some 50 million inhabitants. President Mitterrand received the Ukrainian president. I, myself, met him as well as the Ukrainian foreign minister. Ukraine has taken a stand in favor of demilitarization and is organizing itself into gradually dismantling its nuclear weapons, so we take note of this trend which seems to us the right one, but as long as this is not carried out, we remain cautious. [passage omitted]

[Polaco] I wanted to ask you one question, Mr. Joxe. In so far as research in France represents nearly 70 percent military loans and 30 percent civilian loans, one might say that defense represents most of the research work in France...

[Joxe interrupts] It is the apple of my eye.

[Polaco] I beg your pardon?

[Joxe] It is the apple of my eye.

[Polaco] This has consequences for the economy, considerable consequences. If you cut down on some programs, will money still be put aside for research programs?

[Joxe] I am not cutting down. In certain sectors I keep things the same, and I am increasing defense scientific research. I can tell you that in this field, I enjoy much support from the research minister, Mr. Curien, a professor and physicist and one of the fathers of the Ariane program, the French space program. He is a man who fully understands the military significance of research. We work hand in hand because in the world of today, tomorrow, and of the day after, there will be no military power without combining three factors: first, men and women who accept to devote themselves to defense; equipment and training in how to use it, equipment based on technology and science; behind all this and preparing the future and the defense of the future is scientific research in composite materials, space, data, pictures, and cartography. I reassure you therefore: Everybody knows at the Defense Ministry that I am maniacal about research programs. [passage omitted]

[Question] The question I would like to ask you is one of politics and of the future and is related to European construction. What is the place of our nuclear forces within a prospective European military organization? To whom will the controlling role be given, and who will decide as to its use?

[Presenter] At one time there was talk of a possible spine existing between France and Great Britain at the nuclear level....

[Joxe] As you say, sir, this is one of the most important issues of the future, and President Mitterrand opened the debate a few months ago. Better said, he suggested a debate to discuss to what extent France, which is at the same time one of the few nuclear and space powers, which has considerable military capabilities and a desire for European cooperation, can put its nuclear capabilities in the service of the European defense policy. You understand fully well that, to start with, we usually try to talk to the other, the only other country of democratic Europe which is also a nuclear power, that is Great Britain. It is normal, however, that we should have talks with other European countries as well. As I have organized a big seminar devoted to strategy, which will take place in September and will be concluded by the president himself and attended by several European and also non-European defense ministers, I think that this very wide debate will enable us to examine in what circumstances we can put France's nuclear capabilities in the service of Europe's defense. In the way you ask the question, you are also giving half of the answer when you ask: Who will be in command? Who will have the possibility of using this weapon? Therein lies a political problem. [passage omitted]

We have merely started to discuss all this in very small circles. [passage omitted]

We have not moved very far, and this will undoubtedly take a few more years. [passage omitted]

[Joxe] On certain important military options there is consensus. There is no deep or violent disagreement between political forces. [passage omitted]

[Question] One year ago, we lived through the tragic events in Iraq. [Sentence indistinct] Where is our great Army and what do you think France could have done alone against a country like Iraq?

[Joxe] Alone, nothing.

[Same listener] Nothing?

[Joxe] Not a lot.

[Same listener] Precisely. This is precisely why, when you cut down the number of fighter planes from 450 to 375, when the current military transport plane, the Transals, are at the end of their lifespan and you do not plan to have the super plane before 1994, how can you speak of France as a big military power?

[Joxe] There are two questions within your question: First, what could France have done alone regarding Iraq? The answer is obvious: There was a UN decision calling on countries, some fifteen of them participated in the coalition, to force the Iraqi forces to abandon the country they had invaded. What can France do alone? First, and this is very important, to defend France. The French Armed Forces rely on a fundamental element of our defenses, the nuclear deterrent force which defends France, French territories, and France's main interests. Why? Because it threatens those who would attack us with such an enormous nuclear response that one can think that no one will attack our territory. This, sir, is a fundamental element. [passage omitted]

Second, the French Armed Forces have air, land, and naval capabilities which enable them to be present throughout the world. We have the largest presence throughout the world in relation to our capabilities. In Europe, in Yugoslavia, everybody sees that it is France who brings in the contingents which not only have the largest numbers but are also the most mobile and active

and are entrusted with the most exposed missions. One must not be defeatist. France's capabilities do not rely merely on its equipment, although France is the only West European country that maintains its military equipment budget. All the others are cutting it down: Spain, Italy, Britain, and Germany are all cutting them down. It is only France which maintains this stability. Why? Precisely because I want to maintain its intervention capabilities. [passage omitted]

[Presenter] Thank you, Mr. Minister.

GERMANY

Kohl on CFE Implementation, Personnel Ceiling Pacts

*LD1007140692 Berlin ADN in German 1250 GMT
10 Jul 92*

[Excerpts] Helsinki (ADN)—At a news conference in Helsinki today, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl made it clear that the measures against Yugoslavia decided upon by the Western European Union [WEU] Council of Ministers this morning "are not a question of military coercive measures." [passage omitted]

Speaking about the results of the Helsinki summit, Kohl said that the fact that the CSCE would in the future have more leeway to act and would be able to take peace-keeping measures on its own responsibility was a significant step. "This resolution is not only on paper. This will be clear, above all, from the fact that in the future the CSCE will also be able to fall back on proven organizations such as NATO and the WEU."

The chancellor briefed correspondents on the signing of two disarmament documents that took place in Helsinki today. These are an agreement on the temporary application of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] as well as the "Final Acts" on limiting armed forces personnel. There is a commitment in the CFE treaty to reducing drastically heavy military equipment. The agreement was negotiated two years ago, and it can now start to be implemented. The "Final Acts" on limiting armed forces personnel set upper limits on the number of servicemen for all signatories. "This agreement is a significant step, not least for us Germans, as we are thereby not standing alone with our commitment at that time to reducing the Bundeswehr," Kohl said.

Defense Minister Announces Conventional Arms Cuts*LD1007100992 Hamburg DPA in German 0920 GMT 10 Jul 92*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Defense Minister Volker Ruehe (Christian Democratic Union) has welcomed the signing by the heads of state and government in Helsinki of the documents for the Vienna disarmament agreement. In a statement in Bonn today, Ruehe announced that the Bundeswehr will begin to destroy about 10,000 weapons systems on 3 August. The success in Helsinki has created a further cornerstone for a new security structure, Ruehe said.

UNITED KINGDOM**Defense Study Suggests New Roles for Armed Forces***LD0707112392 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1044 GMT 7 Jul 92*

[By PRESS ASSOCIATION defense correspondent Charles Miller]

[Text] The Armed Forces are to take on new roles to take account of the radical changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the Defence White Paper says today [7 July].

While welcoming detente with the East, emphasis is put on the threat to world security from widespread instability. The massive Soviet nuclear arsenal remains in Russia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, together with large quantities of chemical weapons. "Should, against our hopes and expectations, the reform process not succeed we cannot be sure who will control these," says Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind in a foreword to the paper.

He warns of the new ethnic and territorial conflicts in central Europe, as current tragic events in Yugoslavia show. And he stresses the dangers outside Europe where unstable regimes are acquiring ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

About 10 countries possess biological weapons programmes, about 20 have chemical weapons and more than 20 non-NATO countries have ballistic missiles.

"The tenth anniversary of the Falklands conflict is a cogent reminder of the risk of the unexpected conflict," adds Mr Rifkind. Since 1975, Britain has had four main defence roles—the provision of nuclear forces, defence

of the UK, defence of the central front in Germany by forces based in Europe, and maritime defence of the eastern Atlantic and Channel.

But the White Paper says that major examples of British operations over the past 20 years, such as the Falklands, the Gulf and Northern Ireland, fall outside the four roles.

A fundamental review of the UK's defence strategy has therefore been carried out. The three new overlapping roles are:

- To ensure the protection and security of the UK and dependent territories
- To ensure against any major external threat to the UK and its allies
- To contribute to promoting the UK's wider security interests through the maintenance of international peace and stability. Nuclear forces will underpin all three roles and will continue to be "essential" for British and NATO security.

Although the government has imposed a maximum ceiling of 128 warheads in each of the new Trident submarines, the White Paper says this is self-imposed and could be increased if there are significant developments in missile defence systems. The White Paper says NATO will remain as the body through which Britain will ensure against any major external threat to itself or allies. But the third role, which underscores Britain's increased emphasis on international peacekeeping and policing, could be carried out through NATO, the UN [United Nations], the nine-nation Western European Union or the 52-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Defence chiefs envisage Britain making more substantial contributions to international security in the future. There is a firm commitment to developing "smaller but better forces" following the Options for Change cutback programme.

Plans to re-equip the 1st Armoured Division with new tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and other systems will increase its combat capabilities by 25 percent by 1995 and more than one-third by 2000.

Reflecting Mr Major's commitment to greater openness of government, the White Paper contains precise numbers of equipment for the first time. For example, the number of advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles to be bought for the Royal Navy's Sea Harrier jump-jets is 210, heavy Spearfish torpedoes 100, SA80 infantry rifles 332,000. However some figures, such as the total of Sting Ray lightweight torpedoes, remains classified.

NTIS
ATTN PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD VA

2

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.